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Abstract
Which equilibria will arise in signaling games depends on how the receiver in-
terprets deviations from the path of play. We develop a micro-foundation for these
off-path beliefs, and an associated equilibrium refinement, in a model where equilib-
rium arises through non-equilibrium learning by populations of patient and long-lived
senders and receivers. In our model, young senders are uncertain about the prevailing
distribution of play, so they rationally send out-of-equilibrium signals as experiments
to learn about the behavior of the population of receivers. Differences in the payoff
functions of the types of senders generate different incentives for these experiments.
Using the Gittins index (Gittins, 1979), we characterize which sender types use each
signal more often, leading to a constraint on the receiver’s off-path beliefs based on
“type compatibility” and hence a learning-based equilibrium selection.
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1 Introduction
In a signaling game, a privately informed sender (for instance a student) observes their type
(e.g. ability) and chooses a signal (e.g. education level) that is observed by a receiver (such as
an employer), who then picks an action without observing the sender’s type. These signaling
games can have many perfect Bayesian equilibria, which are supported by different specifications
of how the receiver would update his beliefs about the sender’s type following the observation
of off-path signals that the equilibrium predicts will never occur. These off-path beliefs are
not pinned down by Bayes rule, and solution concepts such as perfect Bayesian equilibrium
and sequential equilibrium place no restrictions on them. This has led to the development of
equilibrium refinements like Cho and Kreps (1987)’s Intuitive Criterion and Banks and Sobel
(1987)’s divine equilibrium that reduce the set of equilibria by imposing restrictions on off-path
beliefs, using arguments about how players should infer the equilibrium meaning of observations
that the equilibrium says should never occur.
This paper uses a learning model to provide a micro-foundation for restrictions on the off-path
beliefs in signaling games, and thus derive restrictions on which Nash equilibria can emerge from
learning. Our learning model has a continuum of agents who are randomly matched each period,
with a constant inflow of new agents who do not know the prevailing distribution of strategies
and a constant outflow of equal size. The large population makes it rational for the agents to
ignore repeated-game effects and ensures the aggregate system is deterministic, while turnover
in the population lets us analyze learning in a stationary model where social steady states exist,
even though individual agents learn.1 To give agents adequate learning opportunities, we assume
that their expected lifetimes are long, so that most agents in the population live a long time.
And to ensure that agents have sufficiently strong incentives to experiment, we suppose that they
are very patient. This leads us to analyze what we call the “patiently stable” steady states of our
learning model.
Our agents are Bayesians who believe they face a time-invariant distribution of opponents’
play. As in much of the learning-in-games literature and most laboratory experiments, these
agents only learn from their personal observations and not from sources such as newspapers,
parents, or friends.2 Therefore, patient young senders will rationally try out different signals to
see how receivers react. This implies some “off-path” signals that have probability zero in a given
equilibrium will occur with small but positive probabilities in the steady states that approximate
it, so we can use Bayes rule to derive restrictions on the receivers’ typical posterior beliefs following
these rare but positive-probability observations. Moreover, differences in the payoff functions of
the sender types lead them to experiment in different ways. As a consequence, we can prove that
patiently stable steady states must be a subset of Nash equilibria where the receiver responds
1It is interesting to note that Spence (1973) also interpreted equilibria as steady states (or “nontransitory
configurations”) of a learning process, though he did not explicitly specify what sort of process he had in mind.
2As we explain in Corollary 1, our main result extends to environments where some fraction of the population
has access to data about the play of others.
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to beliefs about the sender’s type that respect a type compatibility condition. This provides a
learning-based justification for eliminating certain “unintuitive” equilibria in signaling games.
These results also suggest that learning theory could be used to control the rates of off-path play
and hence generate equilibrium refinements in other games.
1.1 A Toy Example
To give some of the intuition for our general results, we study a particular stage game embedded
in an artificially simple learning model, and explain why optimal experimentation rules out a
seemingly unappealing equilibrium outcome. Consider the following signaling game: the sender
is either the high type θH or the low type θL, both equally likely. The sender chooses between two
signals, s ∈ {In, Out}. If the sender plays Out, the game ends and both parties get 0 payoff.
If the sender plays In, the receiver then chooses an action a ∈ {Up, Down}. Payoffs following
the signal In depend on the sender’s type and receiver’s action, as in the following matrix.
signal: In action: Up action: Down
type: θH 2, 2 −2, 0
type: θL 1,−1 −3, 0
Both sender types prefer (In, Up) to Out and prefer Out to (In, Down), while the receiver
prefers Up over Down after signal In if he believes there is greater than 13 chance that the sender
has type θH .
This game has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) where both types choose Out and the
receiver plays Down after In, sustained by the belief that anyone who sends In has probability
p ≤ 13 of being θH . This updating requires the receiver to interpret the off-path In as a signal
that the sender is more likely to be θL, even though θH gets 1 more utility than θL does from In
regardless of the receiver’s strategy. So, “both Out” is eliminated by the D1 criterion.3
Now suppose there are three infinitely lived agents: θH , θL, and R (for receiver). Suppose
that in each period t ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...}, the three agents play a simultaneous-move game, where each
sender type θi chooses a signal sit, and R chooses a single action at to use against both of the
senders. (This is a deterministic analog of the receiver randomly matching with each type with
probability 1/2 without knowing the sender’s type.) At the end of period t, R observes the signal
choices of both types, while θi observes at if and only if sit = In. That is, each agent only learns
from his/her personal experience; by choosing the “outside option” Out, the sender does not
learn how the receiver would have responded to signal In that period.
Agents think that each opponent is committed to some mixed strategy of the stage game and
plays this strategy each period, regardless of their observations of past play: that is, all agents
3Any receiver play at the off-path signal In that makes it weakly optimal for θL to deviate to In would also
make it strictly optimal for θH to deviate. Cho and Kreps (1987)’s D1 criterion therefore requires the receiver to
put 0 probability on θ = θL after In. However, the PBE passes their Intuitive Criterion.
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are strategically myopic in the sense of Fudenberg and Kreps (1993) and do not try to influence
the distribution of strategies they will face in future rounds. At the beginning of t = 1, each type
θi is endowed with a Beta(cU , cD) prior about the probability that R responds to In with Up,
with cD > cU > 0, so they assign higher probability to Down than to Up. R starts with two
independent priors Beta(cHI , cHO ) and Beta(cLI , cLO) about the probabilities that θH and θL choose
In each period, where we only assume cHI , cHO , cLI , cLO > 0. The independence assumption means
that R does not learn about the behavior of one type from the play of the other.
Agents discount payoffs in future periods at rate 0 ≤ δ < 1 and choose a signal or action
each period so as to maximize expected discounted payoffs. Because expected utility maximizing
agents never strictly prefer to randomize, each of them has a deterministic optimal policy, so that
each discount factor δ induces a deterministic infinite history of play (sHt , sLt , at)∞t=1=: Y (δ). When
δ = 0, the agents play myopically every period, and because of our assumption that cD > cU ,
both types choose Out in t = 1. They thus gain no information about R’s play, do not update
their beliefs, and continue playing Out in every future period. So, the unintuitive “both Out”
PBE is the learning outcome when agents are sufficiently impatient. However, we can show for
all large enough δ, that eventually behavior converges to R playing Up and θH playing In each
period.4
We give a sketch of the argument, beginning with characterizing agents’ optimal behavior
each period. R observes the same information regardless of his play, so he plays myopically under
any δ. Let p(ht) be R’s Bayesian posterior belief about the probability that an In sender has
type θH , given history ht. Then at+1 = Up if p(ht) > 13 and at+1 = Down if p(ht) <
1
3 .
Now we turn to θi, whose problem involves active experimentation. Formally, the dynamic
optimization problem facing θi is a one-armed Bernoulli bandit. Choosing sit = Out is equivalent
to taking the safe outside option while choosing sit = In is equivalent to pulling the risky arm
and getting a payoff depending on whether the pull results in a success (at = Up) or a failure
(at = Down). The optimal policy for θi involves the Gittins index (defined later in Equation
(2)). Type θi plays In at those histories where In has a positive Gittins index.
Once a type chooses to play Out in some period, she receives no further information and
will continue to play Out in all subsequent periods. Denote the period in Y (δ) that θi first
switches from In to Out as T (i, δ) ∈ N ∪ {∞}, where T (i, δ) = ∞ means θi plays In forever.
The argument that learning eliminates pooling on Out follows from three observations:
Observation 1. The high type switches to Out later than the low type does, that is, T (H, δ) ≥
T (L, δ). To see why, suppose by way of contradiction that T (H, δ) < T (L, δ). Then, in period
t = T (H, δ), both θH and θL have played In until now and have seen the same history, so they
hold the same belief about R’s play. Yet θH chooses Out at this history while θL chooses In,
meaning θH has a negative Gittins index for In while θL has a positive one. This is impossible,
4In practice, the required patience level is not unreasonably high. When cD = 1.1 cU = 1, cHI = cLO = 1, and
cHO = cLI = 3, for example, δ = 0 yields the pathological PBE as the long-run outcome, but when δ ≥ 0.92 the
long-run outcome involves sHt = In and at = Up.
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since θH ’s payoff from In is always 1 higher than that of θL, so θH ’s index for In is also always
1 higher than that of θL when the two types have the same belief about R’s play.
Observation 2. As the high type becomes patient, she experiments with In arbitrarily many
times, that is, limδ→1 T (H, δ) =∞. This follows because for any fixed full-support prior belief of
θH about R’s mixed strategy, the Gittins index for In stays close to the “success payoff” of 2 for
a length of time that grows to infinity as δ → 1, even in the worst case where R plays Down in
every period.
Observation 3. If the high type plays In sufficiently many times and more often than the
low type does, then eventually R will believe that In senders have greater than 13 chance of being
θH , that is, there exists N¯ ∈ N so that p(hT ) > 13 for any history hT where (i) θH played In at
least N¯ times and (ii) θL played In no more than θH did. This follows from the fact that R’s
belief about θi’s play after niI instances of In and niO instances of Out is Beta(ciI + niI , ciO + niO).
From Observation 2, we see that T (H, δ) is larger than the N¯ of Observation 3 when δ is
sufficiently large. The history up to period t for any t ≥ N¯ will therefore contain at least N¯
periods of θH playing In (namely, the very first N¯ periods of the game), and by Observation 1
θL will have played In no more than θH did in this history. So by Observation 3, p(ht) > 13 for
t ≥ N¯ , meaning at = Up for t ≥ N¯ . Since sHt = In for all t ≤ N¯ and observing Up increases
the Gittins index of In, the high type must always play In. This means limt→∞ sHt = In and
limt→∞ at = Up for large δ < 1.
In this simple learning model, agents are patient and face the same opponents many times
but do not try to influence their future play. Furthermore, agents believe that opponents’ play is
stationary but it changes markedly over time. Finally, the analysis was greatly simplified because
there are only two signals, one of which gives a certain payoff to the senders; this makes playing
Out an absorbing state and, together with the assumption of Beta priors, lets us explicitly
calculate how the system evolves. This paper’s focus is on general signaling games embedded in
a learning model with large populations and anonymous random matching, eliminating repeated-
game effects. We focus on steady states of the model, where the stationary assumption is satisfied.
Also, we relax the Beta prior assumption and allow learners to have fairly general non-doctrinaire
priors. Many results about the steady-state model, however, have analogs in the simple model
above.
Intuitively, θH is “more compatible” with signal In than θL. Definition 2 formalizes this
relation in general signaling games. Observation 1 corresponds to Lemma 2, which shows that
whenever one type is more compatible than another with a signal, the more compatible type sends
the signal more often. Observation 2 corresponds to Lemma 4, which says a sufficiently patient
and long-lived sender type will experiment many times with all signals that have the potential to
strictly improve that type’s equilibrium payoff. Observation 3 corresponds to Lemma 3, which
says receivers can eventually learn the compatibility relation associated with each signal, provided
senders’ play respects the relation and the more compatible type experiments enough with the
signal. Lemmas 2, 3, and 4 are combined to prove the main result of the paper (Theorem 2), a
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learning-based refinement in general signaling games.
1.2 Outline and Overview of Results
Section 2 lays out the notation we will use for signaling games and introduces our learning model.
Section 3 introduces the Gittins index, which we use to analyze the senders’ learning problem.
It also defines type compatibility, which is a partial order that drives our results. We say that
type θ′ is more type-compatible with signal s′ than type θ′′ if, whenever s′ is a weak best response
for θ′′ against some receiver behavior strategy, it is a strict best response for θ′ against the
same strategy. To relate this static definition to the senders’ optimal dynamic learning behavior,
we show that, under our assumptions, the senders’ learning problem is formally a multi-armed
bandit, so the optimal policy of each type is characterized by the Gittins index. Theorem 1 shows
that the compatibility order on types is equivalent to an order on their Gittins indices: θ′ is
more type-compatible with signal s′ than type θ′′ if and only if, whenever s′ has the (weakly)
highest Gittins index for θ′′ , it has the strictly highest index for θ′ , provided the two types hold
the same beliefs and have the same discount factor.
Section 4 studies the aggregate behavior of the sender and receiver populations. There we
define and characterize the aggregate responses of the senders and of the receivers, which are the
analogs of the best-response functions in the one-shot signaling game. First, we use a coupling
argument to extend Theorem 1 to the aggregate sender behavior, proving that types who are
more compatible with a signal send it more often in aggregate (Lemma 2). Then we turn to
the receivers. Intuitively, we would expect that when receivers are long-lived, most of them will
have beliefs that respect type compatibility, and we show that this is the case. More precisely,
we show that most receivers best respond to a posterior belief whose likelihood ratio of θ′ to θ′′
dominates the prior likelihood ratio of these two types whenever they observe a signal s which
is more type-compatible with θ′ than θ′′ . Lemma 3 shows this is true for any signal that is sent
“frequently enough” relative to the receivers’ expected lifespan, using a result of Fudenberg, He,
and Imhof (2017) on updating posteriors after rare events.
Finally, Section 5 combines the earlier results to characterize the steady states of the learning
model, which can be viewed as pairs of mutual aggregate responses, analogous to the definition of
Nash equilibrium. We start by proving Lemma 4, which shows that any signal that is not weakly
equilibrium dominated (see Definition 11) gets sent “frequently enough” in steady state when
senders are sufficiently patient and long lived. Combining the three lemmas discussed above, we
establish our main result: any patiently stable steady state must be a Nash equilibrium satisfying
the additional restriction that the receivers best respond to certain admissible beliefs after every
off-path signal (Theorem 2).
As an example, consider Cho and Kreps (1987)’s beer-quiche game, where it is easy to verify
that the strong type is more compatible with Beer than the weak type. Our results imply that
the strong types will in aggregate send this signal at least as often as the weak types do, and
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that a very patient strong type will experiment with it “many times.” As a consequence, when
senders are patient, long-lived receivers are unlikely to revise the probability of the strong type
downwards following an observation of Beer. Thus, the “both types eat quiche” equilibrium is
not a patiently stable steady state of the learning model, as it would require receivers to interpret
Beer as a signal that the sender is weak.
Finally, Theorem 3 provides a stronger implication of patient stability in generic pure-strategy
equilibria, showing that off-path beliefs must assign probability zero to types that are equilibrium
dominated in the sense of Cho and Kreps (1987).
1.3 Related Work
Fudenberg and Kreps (1988, 1994, 1995) pointed out that experimentation plays an important
role in determining learning outcomes in extensive-form games. As in Fudenberg and Kreps
(1993), they studied a model with a single infinitely-lived and strategically myopic agent in each
player role who acts as if the opponent’s play is stationary. Because these models involved
accumulating information over time, they did not have steady states. Our work is closer to that
of Fudenberg and Levine (1993) and Fudenberg and Levine (2006) which also studied learning by
Bayesian agents in a large population who believe that society is in a steady state. A key issue in
this work, and more generally in studying learning in extensive-form games, is characterizing how
much agents will experiment with myopically suboptimal actions. If agents do not experiment
at all, then non-Nash equilibria can persist, because players can maintain incorrect but self-
confirming beliefs about off-path play. Fudenberg and Levine (1993) showed that patient long-
lived agents will experiment enough at their on-path information sets to learn if they have any
profitable deviations, thus ruling out steady states that are not Nash equilibria. However, more
experimentation than that is needed for learning to generate the sharper predictions associated
with backward induction and sequential equilibrium. Fudenberg and Levine (2006) showed that
patient rational agents need not do enough experimentation to imply backwards induction in
games of perfect information. Later on, we say about how the models and proofs of those papers
differ from ours.
This paper is also related to the Bayesian learning models of Kalai and Lehrer (1993), which
studied two-player games with one agent on each side, so that every self-confirming equilibrium is
path-equivalent to a Nash equilibrium, and Esponda and Pouzo (2016), which allowed agents to
experiment but did not characterize when and how this occurs. It is also related to the literature
on boundedly rational experimentation in extensive-form games (e.g. Jehiel and Samet (2005),
Laslier and Walliser (2015)), where the experimentation rules of the agents are exogenously
specified. We assume that each sender’s type is fixed at birth, as opposed to being i.i.d. over
time. Dekel, Fudenberg, and Levine (2004) showed some of the differences this can make using
various equilibrium concepts, but they did not develop an explicit model of non-equilibrium
learning.
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For simplicity, we assume here that agents do not know the payoffs of other players and have
full support priors over the opposing side’s behavior strategies. Our companion paper Fudenberg
and He (2017) supposed that players assign zero probability to dominated strategies of their
opponents, as in the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987), divine equilibrium (Banks and
Sobel, 1987), and rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Levine, 1999).
There, we analyzed how the resulting micro-founded equilibrium refinement compares to those
in past work.
2 Model
2.1 Signaling Game Notation
A signaling game has two players, a sender (player 1, “she”) and a receiver (player 2, “he”). The
sender’s type is drawn from a finite set Θ according to a prior λ ∈ ∆(Θ) with λ(θ) > 0 for all
θ.5 There is a finite set S of signals for the sender and a finite set A of actions for the receiver.6
The utility functions of the sender and receiver are u1 : Θ×S ×A→ R and u2 : Θ×S ×A→ R
respectively.
When the game is played, the sender knows her type and sends a signal s ∈ S to the receiver.
The receiver observes the signal, then responds with an action a ∈ A. Finally, payoffs are realized.
A behavior strategy for the sender pi1 = (pi1(·|θ))θ∈Θ is a type-contingent mixture over signals
S. Write Π1 for the set of all sender behavior strategies.
A behavior strategy for the receiver pi2 = (pi2(·|s))s∈S is a signal-contingent mixture over
actions A. Write Π2 for the set of all receiver behavior strategies.
2.2 Learning by Individual Agents
We now build a learning model with a given signaling game as the stage game. In this subsection,
we explain an individual agent’s learning problem. In the next subsection, we complete the
learning model by describing a society of learning agents who are randomly matched to play the
signaling game every period.
Time is discrete and all agents are rational Bayesians with geometrically distributed lifetimes.
They survive between periods with probability 0 ≤ γ < 1 and further discount future utility
flows by 0 ≤ δ < 1, so their objective is to maximize the expected value of ∑∞t=0(γδ)t · ut. Here,
0 ≤ γδ < 1 is the effective discount factor, and ut is the payoff t periods from today.
At birth, each agent is assigned a role in the signaling game: either as a sender with type θ or
as a receiver. Agents know their role, which is fixed for life. Every period, each agent is randomly
5Here and subsequently, ∆(X) denotes the collection of probability distributions on the set X.
6To lighten notation we assume that the same set of actions is feasible following any signal. This is without
loss of generality for our results as we could let the receiver have very negative payoffs when he responds to a
signal with an “impossible” action.
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and anonymously matched with an opponent to play the signaling game, and the game’s outcome
determines the agent’s payoff that period. At the end of each period, agents observe the outcomes
of their own matches, that is, the signal sent, the action played in response, and the sender’s
type. They do not observe the identity, age, or past experiences of their opponents, nor does the
sender observe how the receiver would have reacted to a different signal.7 Agents update their
beliefs and play the signaling game again with new random opponents next period, provided they
are still alive.
Agents believe they face a fixed but unknown distribution of opponents’ aggregate play, so
they believe that their observations will be exchangeable. We feel that this is a plausible first
hypothesis in many situations, so we expect that agents will maintain their belief in stationarity
when it is approximately correct, but will reject it given clear evidence to the contrary, as when
there is a strong time trend or a high-frequency cycle. The environment will indeed be constant
in the steady states that we analyze.
Formally, each sender is born with a prior density function over the aggregate behavior strat-
egy of the receivers, g1 : Π2 → R+, which integrates to 1. Similarly, each receiver is born with
a prior density over the sender’s behavior strategies8, g2 : Π1 → R+. We denote the marginal
distribution of g1 on signal s as g(s)1 , so that g
(s)
1 (pi2(·|s)) is the density of the new senders’ prior
over how receivers respond to signal s. Similarly, we denote the θ marginal of g2 as g(θ)2 , so that
g
(θ)
2 (pi1(·|θ)) is the new receivers’ prior density over pi1(·|θ) ∈ ∆(S).
It is important to remember that g1 and g2 are beliefs over opponents’ strategies, but not
strategies themselves. A new sender expects the response to s to be
∫
pi2(·|s) · g1(pi2)dpi2 while a
new receiver expects type θ to play
∫
pi1(·|θ) · g2(pi1)dpi1.
We now state a regularity assumption on the agents’ priors that will be maintained through-
out.
Definition 1. A prior g = (g1, g2) is regular if
(i). [independence] g1(pi2) =
∏
s∈S
g
(s)
1 (pi2(·|s)) and g2(pi1) =
∏
θ∈Θ
g
(θ)
2 (pi1(·|θ)).
(ii). [g1 non-doctrinaire] g1 is continuous and strictly positive on the interior of Π2.
7The receiver’s payoff reveals the sender’s type for generic assignments of payoffs to terminal nodes. If the
receiver’s payoff function is independent of the sender’s type, his beliefs about it are irrelevant. If the receiver
does care about the sender’s type but observes neither the sender’s type nor his own realized payoff, a great many
outcomes can persist, as in Dekel, Fudenberg, and Levine (2004).
8Note that the agent’s prior belief is over opponents’ aggregate play (i.e. Π1 or Π2) and not over the prevailing
distribution of behavior strategies in the opponent population (i.e. ∆(Π2) or ∆(Π1)), since under our assumption
of anonymous random matching, these are observationally equivalent for our agents. For instance, a receiver
cannot distinguish between a society where all type θ randomize 50-50 between signals s1 and s2 each period,
and another society where half of the type θ always play s1 while the other half always plays s2. Note also that
because agents believe the system is in a steady state, they do not care about calendar time and do not have beliefs
about it. Fudenberg and Kreps (1994) suppose that agents append a non-Bayesian statistical test of whether their
observations are exchangeable to a Bayesian model that presumes exchangeability.
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(iii). [g2 nice] for each type θ, there are positive constants
(
α(θ)s
)
s∈S such that
pi1(·|θ) 7→ g
(θ)
2 (pi1(·|θ))∏
s∈S pi1(s|θ)α(θ)s −1
is uniformly continuous and bounded away from zero on the relative interior of Π(θ)1 , the
set of behavior strategies of type θ.
Independence ensures that a receiver does not learn how type θ plays by observing the behavior
of some other type θ′ 6= θ, and that a sender does not learn how receivers react to signal s by
experimenting with some other signal s′ 6= s. For example, this means in Cho and Kreps (1987)’s
beer-quiche game that the sender does not learn how receivers respond to beer by eating quiche.9
The non-doctrinaire nature of g1 and g2 implies that the agents never see an observation that
they assigned zero prior probability, so that they have a well-defined optimization problem after
any history. Non-doctrinaire priors also imply that a large enough data set can outweigh prior
beliefs (Diaconis and Freedman, 1990). The niceness assumption in (iii) ensures that g2 behaves
like a power function near the boundary of Π1. Any density that is strictly positive on Π1 satisfies
this condition, as does the Dirichlet distribution, which is the prior associated with fictitious play
(Fudenberg and Kreps, 1993).
The set of histories for an age t sender of type θ is Yθ[t] := (S × A)t, where each period, the
history records the signal sent and the action that her receiver opponent took in response. The
set of all histories for a type θ is the union Yθ :=
⋃∞
t=0 Yθ[t]. The dynamic optimization problem
of type θ has an optimal policy function σθ : Yθ → S, where σθ(yθ) is the signal that a type θ
with history yθ would send the next time she plays the signaling game. Analogously, the set of
histories for an age t receiver is Y2[t] := (Θ×S)t, where each period, the history records the type
of his sender opponent and the signal that she sent. The set of all receiver histories is the union
Y2 :=
⋃∞
t=0 Y2[t]. The receiver’s learning problem admits an optimal policy function σ2 : Y2 → AS,
where σ2(y2) is the pure strategy that a receiver with history y2 would commit to next time he
plays the game.10
2.3 Random Matching and Aggregate Play
We analyze learning in a deterministic stationary model with a continuum of agents, as in Fu-
denberg and Levine (1993, 2006). One innovation is that we let lifetimes follow a geometric
9One could imagine learning environments where the senders believe that the responses to various signals are
correlated, but independence is a natural special case.
10Because our agents are expected-utility maximizers, it is without loss of generality to assume each agent uses
a deterministic policy rule. If more than one such rule exists, we fix one arbitrarily. Of course, the optimal policies
σθ and σ2 depend on the prior g as well as the effective discount factor δγ. Where no confusion arises, we suppress
these dependencies.
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distribution instead of the finite and deterministic lifetimes assumed in those earlier papers, so
that we can use the Gittins index.
The society contains a unit mass of agents in the role of receivers and mass λ(θ) in the role
of type θ for each θ ∈ Θ. As described in Subsection 2.2, each agent has 0 ≤ γ < 1 chance
of surviving at the end of each period and complementary chance 1 − γ of dying. To preserve
population sizes, (1−γ) new receivers and λ(θ)(1−γ) new type θ are born into the society every
period.
Each period, agents in the society are matched uniformly at random to play the signaling
game. In the spirit of the law of large numbers, each sender has probability (1−γ)γt of matching
with a receiver of age t, while each receiver has probability λ(θ)(1−γ)γt of matching with a type
θ of age t.
A state ψ of the learning model is described by the mass of agents with each possible history.
We write it as
ψ ∈ (×θ∈Θ∆(Yθ))×∆(Y2).
We refer to the components of a state ψ by ψθ ∈ ∆(Yθ) and ψ2 ∈ ∆(Y2).
Given the agents’ optimal policies, each possible history for an agent completely determines
how that agent will play in their next match. The sender policy functions σθ are maps from
sender histories to signals,11 so they naturally extend to maps from distributions over sender
histories to distributions over signals. That is, given the policy function σθ, each state ψ induces
an aggregate behavior strategy σθ(ψθ) ∈ ∆(S) for each type θ population, where we extend the
domain of σθ from Yθ to ∆(Yθ) in the natural way:
σθ(ψθ)(s) := ψθ {yθ ∈ Yθ : σθ(yθ) = s} . (1)
Similarly, state ψ and the optimal receiver policy σ2 together induce an aggregate behavior
strategy σ2(ψ2) for the receiver population, where
σ2(ψ2)(a|s) := ψ2 {y2 ∈ Y2 : σ2(y2)(s) = a} .
We will study the steady states of this learning model, to be defined more precisely in Section
5. Loosely speaking, a steady state is a state ψ that reproduces itself indefinitely when agents
use their optimal policies. Put another way, a steady state induces a time-invariant distribution
over how the signaling game is played in the society. Suppose society is at steady state today and
we measure what fraction of type θ sent a certain signal s in today’s matches. After all agents
modify their strategies based on their updated beliefs and all births and deaths take place, the
fraction of type θ playing s in the matches tomorrow will be the same as today.
11Remember that we have fixed deterministic policy functions.
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3 Senders’ Optimal Policies and Type Compatibility
This section studies the senders’ learning problem. We will prove that differences in the payoff
structures of the various sender types generate certain restrictions on their behavior in the learning
model. Subsection 3.1 notes that the senders face a multi-armed bandit, so the Gittins index
characterizes their optimal policies, and shows how to relate the Gittins index of a signal to the
expected sender payoff versus a particular mixed strategy of the receiver. In Subsection 3.2, we
define type compatibility, which formalizes what it means for type θ′ to be more “compatible” with
a given signal s than type θ′′ is. The definition of type compatibility is static, in the sense that
it depends only on the two types’ payoff functions in the one-shot signaling game. Subsection
3.3 relates type compatibility to the Gittins index, which applies to the dynamic learning model.
Lemma 2in Section 4 uses this relationship to show that if type θ′ is more compatible with signal
s than type θ′′ , then faced with any fixed distribution of receiver play the type θ′ population
sends s more often in the aggregate than the type θ′′ population does.
3.1 Optimal Policies and Multi-Armed Bandits
Each type θ sender thinks she is facing a fixed but unknown aggregate receiver behavior strategy
pi2, so each period when she sends signal s, she believes that the response is drawn from some
pi2(·|s) ∈ ∆(A), i.i.d. across periods. Because her beliefs about the responses to the various signals
are independent, her problem is equivalent to a discounted multi-armed bandit, with signals s ∈ S
as the arms, where the rewards of arm s are distributed according to u1(θ, s, pi2(·|s)).
Let νs ∈ ∆(∆(A)) be a belief over the space of mixed replies to signal s, and let ν = (νs)s∈S
be a profile of such beliefs. Write I(θ, s, ν, β) for the Gittins index of signal s for type θ, with
beliefs ν over receiver’s play after various signals and with effective discount factor β = δγ, so
that
I(θ, s, ν, β) := sup
τ>0
Eνs
{∑τ−1
t=0 β
t · u1(θ, s, as(t))
}
Eνs
{∑τ−1
t=0 β
t
} . (2)
Here as(t) is the receiver’s response that the sender observes the t-th time she sends signal s,
τ is a stopping time12 and the expectation Eνs over the sequence of responses {as(t)}t≥0 depends
on the sender’s belief νs about responses to signal s.13
The Gittins index theorem (Gittins, 1979) implies that after every positive-probability history
yθ, the optimal policy σθ for a sender of type θ sends the signal that has the highest Gittins index
12That is, whether or not τ = t depends only on the realizations of as(0), as(1), ..., as(t− 1).
13The Gittins index can be interpreted as the value of an auxiliary optimization problem, where type θ chooses
each period to either send signal s and obtain a payoff according to a random receiver action drawn according
to pi2(·|s), or to stop forever. The objective of the auxiliary problem is to maximize the per-period expected
discounted payoff until stopping, as the numerator of Equation (2) describes the expected discounted sum of
payoffs until stopping while the denominator shows the expected discounted number of periods until stopping.
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for that type under the profile of posterior beliefs (νs)s∈S that is induced by yθ.
Importantly, we can reformulate the objective function defining the Gittins index in Equation
(2), linking it to the one-shot signaling game payoff structure.
Lemma 1. For every signal s, stopping time τ , belief νs, and discount factor β, there exists
pi2,s(τ, νs, β) ∈ ∆(A) so that for every θ,
Eνs
{∑τ−1
t=0 β
t · u1(θ, s, as(t))
}
Eνs
{∑τ−1
t=0 β
t
} = u1(θ, s, pi2,s(τ, νs, β))
That is to say, when the stopping problem in Equation (2) is evaluated at an arbitrary stopping
time τ, the payoff is equal to sender’s expected utility from playing s against the receiver strategy
pi2,s(τ, νs, β) in the one-shot signaling game.
The proof of Lemma 1 is in Appendix A.2 and shows how to construct pi2,s(τ, νs, β), which
can be interpreted as a discounted time average over the receiver actions that are observed before
stopping. To illustrate the construction, suppose νs is supported on two pure receiver strategies
after s: either pi2(a
′ |s) = 1 or pi2(a′′ |s) = 1, with both strategies equally likely. Suppose also
u1(θ, s, a
′) > u1(θ, s, a
′′). Consider the stopping time τ that specifies stopping after the first time
the receiver plays a′′ . Then the discounted time average frequency of a′′ is:
∑∞
t=0 β
t · Pνs [τ ≥ t and receiver plays a′′ in period t]∑∞
t=0 β
t · Pνs [τ ≥ t]
= 0.51 +∑∞t=1 βt · 0.5 =
1− β
2− β .
So pi2,s(τ, νs, β)(a
′′) = 1−β2−β and similarly we can calculate that pi2,s(τ, νs, β)(a
′) = 12−β , which
shows that pi2,s indeed corresponds to a mixture over receiver actions for each β. As β → 1, this
mixture converges to the pure strategy of always playing a′ , so u1(θ, s, pi2,s(τ, νs, β)) converges to
u1(θ, s, a
′), the highest possible payoff for type θ after s; this parallels the fact that as β tends to
1, the Gittins index for θ after s converges to the highest payoff in the support of the belief νs.
3.2 Type Compatibility in Signaling Games
We now introduce a notion of the comparative compatibility of two types with a given signal in
the one-shot signaling game.
Definition 2. Signal s′ is more type-compatible with θ′ than θ′′ , written as θ′ s′ θ′′ , if for every
pi2 ∈ Π2 such that
u1(θ
′′
, s
′
, pi2(·|s′)) ≥ max
s′′ 6=s′
u1(θ
′′
, s
′′
, pi2(·|s′′)),
we have
u1(θ
′
, s
′
, pi2(·|s′)) > max
s′′ 6=s′
u1(θ
′
, s
′′
, pi2(·|s′′)).
In words, θ′ s′ θ′′ means that whenever s′ is a weak best response for θ′′ against some
receiver behavior strategy pi2, it is also a strict best response for θ
′ against pi2.
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The following proposition says the compatibility order is transitive and essentially asymmetric.
Its proof is in Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1.
(i). s′ is transitive.
(ii). Except when s′ is either strictly dominant for both θ′ and θ′′ or strictly dominated for both
θ
′ and θ′′ , θ′ s′ θ′′ implies θ′′ 6s′ θ′ .
To check the compatibility condition, one must consider all strategies in Π2, just as the belief
restrictions in divine equilibrium involve all the possible mixed best responses to various beliefs.
However, when the sender’s utility function is separable in the sense that u1(θ, s, a) = v(θ, s) +
z(a), as in Spence (1973)’s job-market signaling game and in Cho and Kreps (1987)’s beer-quiche
game (given below), a sufficient condition for θ′ s′ θ′′ is
v(θ′ , s′)− v(θ′′ , s′) > max
s′′ 6=s′
v(θ′ , s′′)− v(θ′′ , s′′).
This can be interpreted as saying s′ is the least costly signal for θ′ relative to θ′′ . In the Online
Appendix, we present a general sufficient condition for θ′ s′ θ′′ under general payoff functions.
Example 1. (Cho and Kreps (1987)’s beer-quiche game) The sender (P1) is either strong (θstrong)
or weak (θweak), with prior probability λ(θstrong) = 0.9. The sender chooses to either drink Beer
or eat Quiche for breakfast. The receiver (P2), observing this breakfast choice but not the
sender’s type, chooses whether to Fight the sender. If the sender is θweak, the receiver prefers
to Fight. If the sender is θstrong, the receiver prefers to NotFight. Also, θstrong prefers Beer
for breakfast while θweak prefers Quiche for breakfast. Both types prefer not being fought over
having their favorite breakfast.
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This game has separable sender utility with v(θstrong,Beer) = v(θweak,Quiche) = 1, z(Fight) =
0 and z(NotFight) = 2. So, we have θstrong Beer θweak. 
It is easy to see that in every Nash equilibrium pi∗, if θ′ s′ θ′′ , then pi∗1(s′|θ′′) > 0 implies
pi∗1(s
′|θ′) = 1. By Bayes rule, this implies that the receiver’s equilibrium belief p after every on-
path signal s′ satisfies the restriction p(θ
′′ |s′)
p(θ′|s′) ≤
λ(θ′′)
λ(θ′) if θ
′ s′ θ′′ . Thus in every Nash equilibrium
of the beer-quiche game, if the sender chooses Beer with positive ex ante probability, then the
receiver’s odds ratio that the sender is tough after seeing this signal cannot be less than the
prior odds ratio. Our main result, Theorem 2, essentially shows for any strategy profile that
can be approximated by steady-state outcomes with patient and long-lived agents, that the same
compatibility-based restriction is satisfied even for off-path signals. In particular, this allows us
to place restrictions on the receiver’s belief after seeing Beer in equilibria where no type of sender
ever plays this signal.
3.3 Type compatibility and the Gittins index
We now connect the type compatibility order for a given signal with the associated Gittins indices.
Theorem 1. θ′ s′ θ′′ if and only if for every β ∈ [0, 1) and every profile of beliefs ν,
I(θ′′ , s′ , ν, β) ≥ maxs′′ 6=s′ I(θ′′ , s′′ , ν, β) implies I(θ′ , s′ , ν, β) > maxs′′ 6=s′ I(θ′ , s′′ , ν, β).
That is, θ′ s′ θ′′ if and only if whenever s′ has the (weakly) highest Gittins index for θ′′ ,
it has the highest index for θ,′ provided the two types hold the same beliefs and have the same
discount factor. The proof involves reformulating the Gittins index as in Lemma 1, then applying
the compatibility definition.
Proof. Step 1: Only If.
Suppose θ′ s′ θ′′ and fix some β ∈ [0, 1) and prior belief ν. Suppose I(θ′′ , s′ , ν, β) ≥
maxs′′ 6=s′ I(θ
′′
, s
′′
, ν, β). We show that I(θ′ , s′ , ν, β) > maxs′′ 6=s′ I(θ
′
, s
′′
, ν, β).
On any arm s′′ 6= s′ , type θ′′ could use the (suboptimal) stopping time τ θ′
s′′ , which by Lemma
1 yields an expected per-period payoff of u1(θ
′′
, s
′′
, pis′′ (νs′′ , τ θ
′
s′′ , β)). This is a lower bound for
the Gittins index of arm s′′for type θ′′ , so combined with the hypothesis that I(θ′′ , s′ , ν, β) ≥
maxs′′ 6=s′ I(θ
′′
, s
′′
, ν, β), we get
I(θ′′ , s′ , ν, β) ≥ max
s′′ 6=s′
u1(θ
′′
, s
′′
, pis′′ (νs′′ , τ θ
′
s′′ , β)). (3)
Now define the receiver strategy pi2 ∈ Π2 by pi2(·|s′) := pis′ (νs′ , τ θ
′′
s′ , β), pi2(·|s
′′) := pis′′ (νs′′ , τ θ
′
s′′ , β)
for all s′′ 6= s′ . Then Equation (3) can be rewritten as
u1(θ
′′
, s
′
, pi2(·|s′)) ≥ max
s′′ 6=s′
u1(θ
′′
, s
′′
, pi2(·|s′′)),
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that is, s′ is weakly optimal for θ′′ against pi2. By the definition of θ
′ s′ θ′′ , this implies s′ is
strictly optimal for θ′ against pi2.
From the definition of pi2 and Lemma 1, the expected utility of θ
′ playing any s′′ 6= s′
against pi2 is equal to the Gittins index of that arm for θ
′
, namely I(θ′ , s′′ , ν, β). On the
other hand, u1(θ
′
, s
′
, pi2(·|s′)) is only a lower bound for I(θ′ , s′ , ν, β). This shows I(θ′ , s′ , ν, β) >
maxs′′ 6=s′ I(θ
′
, s
′′
, ν, β) as desired.
Step 2: If.
Suppose θ′ 6 s′θ′′ . Then there is some receiver strategy pi∗2 ∈ Π2 such that
u1(θ
′′
, s
′
, pi∗2(·|s
′)) ≥ max
s′′ 6=s′
u1(θ
′′
, s
′′
, pi∗2(·|s
′′)), and
u1(θ
′
, s
′
, pi∗2(·|s
′)) ≤ max
s′′ 6=s′
u1(θ
′
, s
′′
, pi∗2(·|s
′′)).
Let ν∗ be any belief that induces pi∗2 on average, that is to say for each s,
pi∗2(·|s) =
∫
pi2,s∈∆(A)
pi2,sdν
∗
s (pi2,s)
Let β = 0. Then I(θ, s, ν∗, 0) = u1(θ, s, pi∗2(·|s)) for every θ, s, since the Gittins index is equal
to the myopic payoff when the decision-maker is perfectly impatient. This shows I(θ′′ , s′ , ν∗, 0) ≥
maxs′′ 6=s′ I(θ
′′
, s
′′
, ν∗, 0) and I(θ′ , s′ , ν∗, 0) ≤ maxs′′ 6=s′ I(θ′ , s′′ , ν∗, 0).
4 The Aggregate Sender and Receiver Responses
In this section, we will define and analyze the aggregate sender response R1 : Π2 → Π1 and the
aggregate receiver response R2 : Π1 → Π2. Loosely speaking, these are the large-populations
learning analogs of the best-response functions in the static signaling game. If we fix the aggregate
play of −i population at pi−i and run the learning model period after period from an arbitrary
initial state, the distribution of play in i population will approach Ri[pi−i]. Later in Section 5,
the fixed points of the pair (R1,R2) will characterize the steady states of the learning system.
4.1 The Aggregate Sender Response
To formally define the aggregate sender response, we first introduce the one-period-forward map.
Definition 3. The one-period-forward map for type θ, fθ : ∆(Yθ)× Π2 → ∆(Yθ) is
fθ[ψθ, pi2](yθ, (s, a)) := ψθ(yθ) · γ · 1{σθ(yθ) = s} · pi2(a|s)
and fθ[ψθ, pi2](∅) := 1− γ.
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If the distribution over histories in the type θ population is ψθ and the receiver population’s
aggregate play is pi2, the resulting distribution over histories in the type θ population is fθ[ψθ, pi2].
Specifically, there will be a 1−γ mass of new type θ who will have no history. Also, if the optimal
first signal of a new type θ is s′ , that is if σθ(∅) = s′ , then fθ[ψθ, pi2](s′ , a′) = γ · (1− γ) · pi2(a′ |s′)
new senders send s′ in their first match, observe action a′ in response, and survive. In general,
a type θ who has history yθ and whose policy σθ(yθ) prescribes playing s has pi2(a|s) chance
of having subsequent history (yθ, (s, a)) provided she survives until next period; the survival
probability corresponds to the factor γ.
Write fTθ for the T -fold application of fθ on ∆(Yθ), holding fixed some pi2. Note that for
arbitrary states ψ and ψ′ , if (yθ, (s, a)) is a length-1 history (i.e. yθ = ∅), then ψθ(yθ) = ψ′θ(yθ)
because both states must assign mass 1 − γ to ∅, so f 1θ [ψθ, pi2] and f 1θ [ψ′θ, pi2] agree on Yθ[1].
Iterating, for T = 2, f 2θ [ψθ, pi2] and f 2θ [ψ
′
θ, pi2] agree on Yθ[2], because each history in Yθ[2] can
be written as (yθ, (s, a)) for yθ ∈ Yθ[1], and f 1θ [ψθ, pi2] and f 1θ [ψ′θ, pi2] match on all yθ ∈ Yθ[1].
Proceeding inductively, we can conclude that fTθ (ψθ, pi2) and fTθ (ψ
′
θ, pi2) agree on all Yθ[t] for
t ≤ T for any pair of type θ states ψθ and ψ′θ. This means limT→∞ fTθ (ψθ, pi2) exists and is
independent of the initial state ψθ. Denote this limit as ψpi2θ . It is the long-run distribution over
type θ histories induced by starting at an arbitrary state and fixing the receiver population’s play
at pi2, as stated formally in the next definition.
Definition 4. The aggregate sender response R1 : Π2 → Π1 is defined by
R1[pi2](s|θ) := ψpi2θ (yθ : σθ(yθ) = s)
where ψpi2θ := limT→∞ fTθ (ψθ, pi2) with ψθ any arbitrary θ state.
That is, R1[pi2](·|θ) is the long-run aggregate behavior in the type θ population when the
receivers’ aggregate play is fixed at pi2.
Remark 1. Technically, R1 depends on g1, δ, and γ, just like σθ does. When relevant, we will
make these dependencies clear by adding the appropriate parameters as superscripts to R1, but
we will mostly suppress them to lighten notation.
Remark 2. Although the aggregate sender response is defined at the aggregate level, R1[pi2](·|θ)
also describes the probability distribution of the play of a single type θ sender over her lifetime
when she faces receiver play drawn from pi2 every period.14
14Observe that fθ[ψθ, pi2] restricted to Yθ[1] gives the probability distribution over histories for a type θ who
uses σθ and faces play drawn from pi2 for one period: it puts weight pi2(a
′ |s′) on history (s′ , a′) where s′ = σθ(∅).
Similarly, fTθ [ψθ, pi2] restricted to Yθ[t] for any t ≤ T gives the probability distribution over histories for someone
who uses σθ and faces play drawn from pi2 for t periods. Since ψpi2θ assigns probability (1 − γ)γt to the set of
histories Yθ[t], R1[pi2](·|θ) = σθ(ψpi2θ ) is a weighted average over the distributions of period t play (t = 1, 2, 3, ...)
of someone using σθ and facing pi2, with weight (1− γ)γt given to the period t distribution.
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4.2 Type Compatibility and the Aggregate Sender Response
The next lemma shows how type compatibility translates into restrictions on the aggregate sender
response for different types.
Lemma 2. Suppose θ′ s′ θ′′. Then for any regular prior g1, 0 ≤ δ, γ < 1, and any pi2 ∈ Π2, we
have R1[pi2](s
′|θ′) ≥ R1[pi2](s′|θ′′).
Theorem 1 showed that when θ′ s′ θ′′ and the two types share the same beliefs, if θ′′plays s′
then θ′ must also play s′ . But even though new agents of both types start with the same prior
g1, their beliefs may quickly diverge during the learning process due to σθ′ and σθ′′ prescribing
different experiments after the same history. This lemma shows that compatibility still imposes
restrictions on the aggregate play of the sender population: Regardless of the aggregate play pi2
in the receiver population, the frequencies that s′ appears in the aggregate responses of different
types are always co-monotonic with the compatibility order s′ .
To gain intuition for Lemma 2, consider two new senders with types θstrong and θweak who
are learning to play the beer-quiche game from Example 1. Suppose they have uniform priors
over the responses to each signal, and that they face a sequence of receivers programmed to play
Fight after Beer and NotFight after Quiche. Since observing Fight is the worst possible
news about a signal’s payoff, the Gittins index of a signal decreases when Fight is observed.
Conversely, the Gittins index of a signal increases after each observation of NotFight.15 Thus
given the assumed play of the receivers, there are n1, n2 ≥ 0 such that type θstrong play Beer
for n1 periods (and observe n1 instances of Fight) and then switch to Quiche forever after,
while type θweak will play Beer for n2 periods before switching to Quiche forever after. Now we
claim that n1 ≥ n2. To see why, suppose instead that n1 < n2, and let ν be the posterior belief
about receivers’ aggregate play induced from n1 periods of observing Fight after Beer. After n1
periods, both types would share the belief ν. Then at belief ν type θweak must play Beer while
type θstrong plays Quiche, so signal Beer must have the highest Gittins index for θweak but not
for θstrong. But this would contradict Theorem 1.
The proof of Lemma 2 relies on the similar idea of fixing a particular “programming” of
receiver play and studying the induced paths of experimentation for different types. In the
aggregate learning model, the sequence of responses that a given sender encounters in her life
depends on the realization of the random matching process, because different receivers have
different histories and respond differently to a given signal. We can index all possible sequences
of random matching realizations using a device we call the “pre-programmed response path”.
To show that more compatible types play a given signal more often, it suffices to show this
comparison holds on each pre-programmed response path, thus coupling the learning processes
of types θ′ and θ′′ . We will show that the intuition above extends to signaling games with any
number of signals and to any pre-programmed response path.
15This follows from Bellman (1956)’s Theorem 2 on Bernoulli bandits.
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Definition 5. A pre-programmed response path a = (a1,s, a2,s, ..., )s∈S is an element in ×s∈S (A∞).
A pre-programmed response path is an |S|-tuple of infinite sequences of receiver actions, one
sequence for each signal. For a given pre-programmed response path a, we can imagine starting
with a new type θ and generating receiver play each period in the following programmatic manner:
when the sender plays s for the j-th time, respond with receiver action aj,s. (If the sender sends
s
′′ five times and then sends s′ 6= s′′ , the response she gets to s′ is a1,s′ , not a6,s′ .) For a type θ
who applies σθ each period, a induces a deterministic history of experiments and responses, which
we denote yθ(a). The induced history yθ(a) can be used to calculate R1[a](·|θ), the distribution
of signals over the lifetime of a type θ induced by the pre-programmed response path a. Namely,
R1[a](·|θ) is simply a mixture over all signals sent along the history yθ(a), with weight (1−γ)γt−1
given to the signal in period t.
Now consider a type θ facing actions generated i.i.d. from the receiver behavior strategy
pi2 each period, as in the interpretation of R1 in Remark 2. This data-generating process is
equivalent to drawing a random pre-programmed response path a at time 0 according to a suitable
distribution, then producing all receiver actions using a. That is, R1[pi2](·|θ) = ∫ R1[a](·|θ)dpi2(a)
where we abuse notation and use dpi2(a) to denote the distribution over pre-programmed response
paths associated with pi2. Importantly, any two types θ
′ and θ′′ face the same distribution over
pre-programmed response paths, so to prove the proposition it suffices to show R1[a](s
′|θ′) ≥
R1[a](s
′ |θ′′) for all a.
Proof. For t ≥ 0, write ytθ for the truncation of infinite history yθ to the first t periods, with
y∞θ := yθ. Given a finite or infinite history ytθ for type θ, the signal counting function #(s|ytθ)
returns how many times signal s has appeared in ytθ. (We need this counting function since the
receiver play generated by a pre-programmed response path each period depends on how many
times each signal has been sent so far.)
As discussed above, we need only show R1[a](s
′ |θ′) ≥ R1[a](s′ |θ′′). Let a be given and write
T θj for the period in which type θ sends signal s
′ for the j-th time in the induced history yθ(a).
If no such period exists, then set T θj =∞. Since R1[a](·|θ) is a weighted average over signals in
yθ(a) with decreasing weights given to later signals, to prove R1[a](s
′ |θ′) ≥ R1[a](s′ |θ′′) it suffices
to show that T θ
′
j ≤ T θ
′′
j for every j. Towards this goal, we will prove a sequence of statements
by induction:
Statement j: Provided T θ
′′
j is finite, #
(
s
′′ | yT
θ
′
j
θ′ (a)
)
≤ #
(
s
′′ | yT
θ
′′
j
θ′′ (a)
)
for all s′′ 6= s′ .
For every j where T θ
′′
j < ∞, statement j implies that the number of periods type θ′ spent
sending each signal s′′ 6= s′ before sending s′ for the j-th time is fewer than the number of periods
θ
′′ spent doing the same. Therefore it follows that θ′ sent s′ for the j-th time sooner than θ′′ did,
that is T θ
′
j ≤ T θ
′′
j . Finally, if T θ
′′
j =∞, then evidently T θ′j ≤ ∞ = T θ
′′
j .
It now remains to prove the sequence of statements by induction.
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Statement 1 is the base case. By way of contradiction, suppose T θ
′′
1 <∞ and
#
(
s
′′ | yT θ
′
1
θ′ (a)
)
> #
(
s
′′ | yT θ
′′
1
θ′′ (a)
)
for some s′′ 6= s′ . Then there is some earliest period t∗ < T θ′1 where
#
(
s
′′ | yt∗θ′ (a)
)
> #
(
s
′′ | yT θ
′′
1
θ′′ (a)
)
,
where type θ′ played s′′ in period t∗, σθ′ (yt
∗−1
θ′ (a)) = s
′′ .
But by construction, by the end of period t∗− 1 type θ′ has sent s′′ exactly as many times as
type θ′′ has sent it by period T θ
′′
1 − 1, so that
#
(
s
′′ | yt∗−1
θ′ (a)
)
= #
(
s
′′ | yT θ
′′
1 −1
θ′′ (a)
)
.
Furthermore, neither type has sent s′ yet, so also
#
(
s
′ | yt∗−1
θ′ (a)
)
= #
(
s
′ | yT θ
′′
1 −1
θ′′ (a)
)
.
Therefore, type θ′ holds the same posterior over the receiver’s reaction to signals s′ and s′′ at
period t∗ − 1 as type θ′′ does at period T θ′′1 − 1. So16 by Theorem 1,
s
′ ∈ arg max
sˆ∈S
I
(
θ
′′
, sˆ, y
T θ
′′
1 −1
θ′′ (a)
)
=⇒ I(θ′ , s′ , yt∗−1
θ′ (a)) > I(θ
′
, s
′′
, yt
∗−1
θ′ (a)). (4)
However, by construction of T θ
′′
1 , we have σθ′′
(
y
T θ
′′
1 −1
θ′′ (a)
)
= s′ . By the optimality of the Gittins
index policy, the left-hand side of Equation (4) is satisfied. But, again by the optimality of the
Gittins index policy, the right-hand side of Equation (4) contradicts σθ′ (yt
∗−1
θ′ (a)) = s
′′ . Therefore
we have proven Statement 1.
Now suppose Statement j holds for all j ≤ K. We show Statement K + 1 also holds. If
T θ
′′
K+1 is finite, then T θ
′′
K is also finite. The inductive hypothesis then shows
#
(
s
′′ | yT θ
′
K
θ′ (a)
)
≤ #
(
s
′′ | yT θ
′′
K
θ′′ (a)
)
16In the following equation and elsewhere in the proof, we abuse notation and write I(θ, s, y) to mean
I(θ, s, g1(·|y), δγ), which is the Gittins index of type θ for signal s at the posterior obtained from updating
the prior g1 using history y, with effective discount factor δγ.
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for every s′′ 6= s′ . Suppose there is some s′′ 6= s′ such that
#
(
s
′′ | yT
θ
′
K+1
θ′ (a)
)
> #
(
s
′′ | yT
θ
′′
K+1
θ′′ (a)
)
.
Together with the previous inequality, this implies type θ′ played s′′ for the[
#
(
s
′′ | yT
θ
′′
K+1
θ′′ (a)
)
+ 1
]
-th time sometime between playing s′ for the K-th time and playing s′
for the (K + 1)-th time. That is, if we put
t∗ := min
{
t : #(s′′ | ytθ′ (a))) > #
(
s
′′ | yT
θ
′′
K+1
θ′′ (a)
)}
,
then T θ
′
K < t
∗ < T θ
′
K+1. By the construction of t∗,
#
(
s
′′ | yt∗−1
θ′ (a)
)
= #
(
s
′′ | yT
θ
′′
K+1−1
θ′′ (a)
)
, and also
#
(
s
′ | yt∗−1
θ′ (a)
)
= K = #
(
s
′ | yT
θ
′′
K+1−1
θ′′ (a)
)
.
Therefore, type θ′ holds the same posterior over the receiver’s reaction to signals s′ and s′′ at
period t∗ − 1 as type θ′′ does at period T θ′′K+1 − 1. As in the base case, we can invoke Theorem 1
to show that it is impossible for θ′ to play s′′ in period t∗ while θ′′ plays s′ in period T θ
′′
K+1. This
shows statement j is true for every j by induction.
4.3 The Aggregate Receiver Response
We now turn to the receivers’ problem. Each new receiver thinks he is facing a fixed but unknown
aggregate sender behavior strategy pi1, with belief over pi1 given by his regular prior g2. To
maximize his expected utility, the receiver must learn to infer the type of the sender from the
signal, using his personal experience.
Unlike the senders whose optimal policies may involve experimentation, the receivers’ problem
only involves passive learning. Since the receiver observes the same information in a match
regardless of his action, the optimal policy σ2(y2) simply best responds to the posterior belief
induced by history y2.
Definition 6. The one-period-forward map for receivers f2 : ∆(Y2)× Π1 → ∆(Y2) is
f2[ψ2, pi1](y2, (θ, s)) := ψ2(y2) · γ · λ(θ) · pi1(s|θ)
and f2(∅) := 1− γ.
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As with the one-period-forward maps fθ for senders, f2[ψ2, pi1] describes the new distribution
over receiver histories tomorrow if the distribution over histories in the receiver population today
is ψ2 and the sender population’s aggregate play is pi1. We write ψpi12 := limT→∞ fT2 (ψ2, pi1) for
the long-run distribution over Y2 induced by fixing sender population’s play at pi1, which is
independent of the particular choice of initial state ψ2.
Definition 7. The aggregate receiver response R2 : Π1 → Π2 is
R2[pi1](a|s) := ψpi12 (y2 : σ2(y2)(s) = a),
where ψpi12 := limT→∞ fT2 (ψ2, pi1) with ψ2 any arbitrary receiver state.
We are interested in the extent to whichR2[pi1] responds to inequalities of the form pi1(s
′ |θ′) ≥
pi1(s
′|θ′′) embedded in pi1, such as those generated when θ′ s′ θ′′ (Lemma 2). To this end, for
any two types θ′ , θ′′ we define Pθ′.θ′′ as those beliefs where the odds ratio of θ
′ to θ′′ exceeds their
prior odds ratio, that is
Pθ′.θ′′ :=
{
p ∈ ∆(Θ) : p(θ
′′)
p(θ′) ≤
λ(θ′′)
λ(θ′)
}
. (5)
If pi1(s
′|θ′) ≥ pi1(s′ |θ′′), pi1(s′ |θ′) > 0, and receiver knows pi1, then receiver’s posterior belief about
sender’s type after observing s′ falls in the set Pθ′.θ′′ . The next lemma shows that under the
additional provisions that pi1(s
′|θ′) is “large enough” and receivers are sufficiently long-lived,
R2[pi1] will best respond to Pθ′.θ′′ with high probability when s
′ is sent.
For P ⊆ ∆(Θ), we let17 BR(P, s) := ⋃p∈P
(
arg max
a′∈A
u2(p, s, a′)
)
; this is the set of best
responses to s supported by some belief in P .
Lemma 3. Let regular prior g2, types θ
′
, θ
′′, and signal s′ be fixed. For every  > 0, there exist
C > 0 and γ < 1 so that for any 0 ≤ δ < 1, γ ≤ γ < 1, and n ≥ 1, if pi1(s′|θ′) ≥ pi1(s′|θ′′) and
pi1(s
′|θ′) ≥ (1− γ)nC, then
R2[pi1](BR(Pθ′.θ′′ , s
′) | s′) ≥ 1− 1
n
− .
This lemma gives a lower bound on the probability that R2[pi1] best responds to Pθ′.θ′′ after
signal s′ . Note that the bound only applies for survival probabilities γ that are close enough to
1, because when receivers have short lifetimes they need not get enough data to outweigh their
prior. Note also that more of the receivers learn the compatibility condition when pi1(s
′|θ′) is
large compared to (1−γ) and almost all of them do in the limit of n ∞.The proof of Lemma 3
relies on Theorem 2 from Fudenberg, He, and Imhof (2017) about updating Bayesian posteriors
after rare events, where the rare event corresponds to observing θ′ play s′ . The details are in
Appendix A.3.
17We abuse notation here and write u2(p, s, a
′) to mean
∑
θ∈Θ u2(θ, s, a
′) · p(θ).
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To interpret the condition pi1(s
′|θ′) ≥ (1− γ)nC, recall that an agent with survival chance γ
has a typical lifespan of 11−γ . If pi1 describes the aggregate play in the sender population, then
on average a type θ′ plays s′ for 11−γ · pi1(s
′|θ′) periods in her life. So when a typical type θ′
plays s′ for nC periods, this lemma provides a bound of 1 − 1
n
−  on the share of the receiver
responses that lie in BR(Pθ′.θ′′ , s
′). Note that the hypothesis θ′ plays s′ for nC periods does not
require that pi1(s
′ |θ′) is bounded away from 0 as γ → 1. To preview, Lemma 4 in the next section
will establish that signals that are not weakly equilibrium dominated for a given type are played
sufficiently often that Lemma 3 has bite when both δ and γ are close to 1.
5 Steady State Implications for Aggregate Play
Section 4 separately examined the senders’ and receivers’ learning problems. In this section, we
turn to the two-sided learning problem. We will first define steady-state strategy profiles, which
are signaling game strategy profiles pi∗ where pi∗1 and pi∗2 are mutual aggregate responses, and then
characterize the steady states using our previous results.
5.1 Steady States, δ-Stability, and Patient Stability
We introduced the one-period-forward maps fθ and f2 in Section 4, which describe the deter-
ministic transition between state ψt this period to state ψt+1 next period through the learn-
ing dynamics and the birth-death process. More precisely, ψt+1θ = fθ(ψtθ, σ2(ψt2)) and ψt+12 =
f2(ψt2, (σθ(ψtθ))θ∈Θ). A steady state is a fixed point ψ∗ of this transition map, .
Definition 8. A state ψ∗ is a steady state if ψ∗θ = fθ(ψ∗θ , σ2(ψ∗2)) for every θ and ψ∗2 = f2(ψ∗2, (σθ(ψ∗θ))θ∈Θ).
The set of all steady states for regular prior g and 0 ≤ δ, γ < 1 is denoted Ψ∗(g, δ, γ), while the
set of steady-state strategy profiles is Π∗(g, δ, γ) := {σ(ψ∗) : ψ∗ ∈ Ψ∗(g, δ, γ)}.
The strategy profiles associated with steady states represent time-invariant distributions of
play, as the information lost when agents die each period exactly balances out the information
agents gain through learning that period. This means the exchangeability assumption of the
learners will be satisfied in any steady state.
We now give an equivalent characterization Π∗(g, δ, γ) in terms of R1 and R2. The proof is
in Appendix A.4.
Proposition 2. pi∗ ∈ Π∗(g, δ, γ) if and only if Rg,δ,γ1 (pi∗2) = pi∗1 and Rg,δ,γ2 (pi∗1) = pi∗2.
(Note that here we make the dependence of R1 and R2 on parameters (g, δ, γ) explicit to
avoid confusion.) That is, a steady-state strategy profile is a pair of mutual aggregate replies.
The next proposition guarantees that there always exists at least one steady-state strategy
profile.
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Proposition 3. Π∗(g, δ, γ) is nonempty and compact in the norm topology.
The proof is in the Online Appendix. We establish that Ψ∗(g, δ, γ) is nonempty and compact
in the `1 norm on the space of distributions, which immediately implies the same properties for
Π∗(g, δ, γ). Intuitively, if lifetimes are finite, the set of histories is finite, so the set of states is of
finite dimension. Here the one-period-forward map f = ((fθ)θ∈Θ, f2) is continuous, so the usual
version of Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem applies. With geometric lifetimes, very old agents are
rare, so truncating the agents’ lifetimes at some large T yields a good approximation. Instead
of using these approximations directly, our proof shows that under the `1 norm f is continuous,
and that (because of the geometric lifetimes) the feasible states form a compact locally convex
Hausdorff space. This lets us appeal to a fixed-point theorem for that domain.
We now focus on the iterated limit
lim
δ→1
lim
γ→1 Π
∗(g, δ, γ),
that is, the set of steady-state strategy profiles for δ and γ near 1, where we first send γ to 1
holding δ fixed, and then send δ to 1.
Definition 9. For each 0 ≤ δ < 1, a strategy profile pi∗ is δ-stable under g if there is a sequence
γk → 1 and an associated sequence of steady-state strategy profiles pi(k) ∈ Π∗(g, δ, γk), such that
pi(k) → pi∗. Strategy profile pi∗ is patiently stable under g if there is a sequence δk → 1 and an
associated sequence of strategy profiles pi(k) where each pi(k) is δk-stable under g and pi(k) → pi∗.
Strategy profile pi∗ is patiently stable if it is patiently stable under some regular prior g.
Heuristically, patiently stable strategy profiles are the limits of learning outcomes when agents
become infinitely patient (so that senders are willing to make many experiments) and long lived
(so that agents on both sides can learn enough for their data to outweigh their prior). As in
past work on steady-state learning (Fudenberg and Levine, 1993, 2006), the reason for this order
of limits is to ensure that most agents have enough data that they stop experimenting and play
myopic best responses.18 We do not know whether our results extend to the other order of limits;
we explain the issues involved below, after sketching the intuition for Proposition 5.
5.2 Preliminary Results on δ-Stability and Patient Stability
When γ is near 1, agents correctly learn the consequences of the strategies they play frequently.
But for a fixed patience level they may choose to rarely or never experiment, and so can maintain
incorrect beliefs about the consequences of strategies that they do not play. The next result
formally states this, which parallels Fudenberg and Levine (1993)’s result that δ-stable strategy
profiles are self-confirming equilibria.
18If agents did not eventually stop experimenting as they age, then even if most agents have approximately
correct beliefs, aggregate play need not be close to a Nash equilibrium because most agents would not be playing
a (static) best response to their beliefs.
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Proposition 4. Suppose strategy profile pi∗ is δ-stable under a regular prior. Then for every type
θ and signal s with pi∗1(s|θ) > 0, s is a best response to some pi2 ∈ Π2 for type θ, and furthermore
pi2(·|s) = pi∗2(·|s). Also, for any signal s such that pi∗1(s|θ) > 0 for at least one type θ, pi∗2(·|s) is
supported on pure best responses to the Bayesian belief generated by pi∗1 after s.
We prove this result in the Online Appendix. The idea of the proof is the following: If signal s
has positive probability in the limit, then it is played many times by the senders, so the receivers
eventually learn the correct posterior distribution for θ given s. As the receivers have no incentive
to experiment, their actions after s will be a best response to this correct posterior belief. For
the senders, suppose pi∗1(s|θ) > 0, but s is not a best response for type θ to any pi2 ∈ Π2 that
matches pi∗2(·|s). Yet if a sender has played s many times then with high probability her belief
about pi2(·|s) is close to pi∗2(·|s), so playing s is not myopically optimal. This would imply that
type θ has persistent option value for signal s, which contradicts the fact that this option value
must converge to 0 with the sample size.
Remark 3. This proposition says that each sender type is playing a best response to a belief about
the receiver’s play that is correct on the equilibrium path, and that the receivers are playing an
aggregate best response to the aggregate play of the senders. Thus the δ-stable outcomes are a
version of self-confirming equilibrium where different types of sender are allowed to have different
beliefs. Moreover, as the next example shows, this sort of heterogeneity in the senders’ beliefs
about the aggregate strategy of the receivers can endogenously arise in a δ-stable strategy profile
even when all types of new senders start with the same prior over how the receivers play. 19
Example 2. Consider the following game:
19Dekel, Fudenberg, and Levine (2004) defined type-heterogeneous self-confirming equilibrium in static Bayesian
games. As they noted, this sort of heterogeneity is natural when the type of each agent is fixed, but not if each
agent’s type is drawn i.i.d. in each period. To extend their definition to signaling games, we can define the “signal
functions” yi(a, θ) from that paper to respect the extensive form of the game. See also ?.
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The receiver is indifferent between all responses. Fix any regular prior g2 for the receiver
and any regular prior g(s
′′ )
1 for the sender. Let g
(s′ )
1 be Beta(1, 3) on a
′ and a′′ respectively. We
claim that it is δ-stable when δ = 0 for both types to send s′′ and for the receiver to respond
to every signal with a′ , which is a type-heterogeneous rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium.
However, this pooling behavior cannot occur in a Nash equilibrium or in a unitary self-confirming
equilibrium, where both sender types must hold the same belief about how the receiver responds
to s′ .
To establish this claim, note that since δ = 0 each sender plays the myopically optimal signal
after every history. For any γ, there is a steady state where the receivers’ policy responds to
every signal with a′ after every history, type θ′′ senders play s′′ after every history and never
update their prior belief about how receivers react to s′ , and type θ′ senders with fewer than 6
periods of experience play s′ but switch to playing s′′ forever starting at age 7. The behavior of
the θ′ agents is optimal because after k periods of playing s′ and seeing response a′ every period,
the sender’s posterior belief about pi2(·|s′) is Beta(1 + k, 3), so the expected payoff from playing
s
′ next period is
1 + k
4 + k (−1) +
3
4 + k (2).
This expression is positive when 0 ≤ k ≤ 5 but negative when k = 6. The fraction of type θ′
aged 6 and below approaches 0 as γ → 1, hence we have constructed a sequence of steady-state
strategy profiles converging to the s′′ pooling equilibrium. So even though both types start with
the same prior g1, their beliefs about how the receivers react to s
′ eventually diverge. 
In contrast to the plethora of δ-stable profiles, we now show that only Nash equilibrium
profiles can be steady-state outcomes as δ tends to 1. Moreover, this limit also rules out strategy
profiles in which the sender’s strategy can only be supported by the belief that the receiver would
play a dominated action in response to some of the unsent signals.
Definition 10. In a signaling game, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with heterogeneous off-path
beliefs is a strategy profile (pi∗1, pi∗2) such that:
• For each θ ∈ Θ, u1(θ; pi∗) = maxs∈S u1(θ, s, pi∗2(·|s)).
• For each on-path signal s, u2(p∗(·|s), s, pi∗2(·|s)) = max
aˆ∈A
u2(p∗(·|s), s, aˆ).
• For each off-path signal s and each a ∈ A with pi∗2(a|s) > 0, there exists a belief p ∈ ∆(Θ)
such that u2(p, s, a) = max
aˆ∈A
u2(p, s, aˆ).
Here u1(θ; pi∗) refers to type θ’s payoff under pi∗, and p∗(·|s) is the Bayesian posterior belief about
sender’s type after signal s, under strategy pi∗1.
The first two conditions imply that the profile is a Nash equilibrium. The third condition
resembles that of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, but is somewhat weaker as it allows the receiver’s
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play after an off-path signal s to be a mixture over several actions, each of which is a best response
to a different belief about the sender’s type. This means pi∗2(·|s) ∈ ∆(BR(∆(Θ), s)), but pi∗2(·|s)
itself may not be a best response to any unitary belief about the sender’s type.
Proposition 5. If strategy profile pi∗ is patiently stable, then it is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
with heterogeneous off-path beliefs.
Proof. In the Online Appendix, we prove that patiently stable profiles must be Nash equilibria.
This argument follows the proof strategy of Fudenberg and Levine (1993), which derived a con-
tradiction via excess option values. In outline, if pi∗ is patiently stable, each player’s strategy is
a best response to a belief that is correct about the opponent’s on-path play. Thus if pi∗ is not
a Nash equilibrium, some type should perceive a persistent option value to experimenting with
some signal that she plays with probability 0. But this would contradict the fact that the option
values evaluated at sufficiently long histories must go to 0. We now explain why a patiently
stable profile pi∗ must satisfy the third condition in Definition 10. After observing any history
y2, a receiver who started with a regular prior thinks every signal has positive probability in his
next match. So, his optimal policy prescribes for each signal s a best response to that receiver’s
posterior belief about the sender’s type upon seeing signal s after history y2. For any regular
prior g, 0 ≤ δ, γ < 1, and any sender aggregate play pi1, we thus deduce Rg,δ,γ2 [pi1](·|s) is en-
tirely supported on BR(∆(Θ), s). This means the the same is true about the aggregate receiver
response in every steady state and hence in every patiently stable strategy profile.
In Fudenberg and Levine (1993), this argument relies on the finite lifetime of the agents only
to ensure that “almost all” histories are long enough, by picking a large enough lifetime. We can
achieve the analogous effect in our geometric-lifetime model by picking γ close to 1. Our proof
uses the fact that if δ is fixed and γ → 1, then the number of experiments that a sender needs to
exhaust her option value is negligible relative to her expected lifespan, so that most senders play
approximate best responses to their current beliefs. The same conclusion does not hold if we fix
γ and let δ → 1, even though the optimal sender policy only depends on the product δγ, because
for a fixed sender policy the induced distribution on sender play depends on γ but not on δ.
5.3 Patient Stability Implies the Compatibility Criterion
Proposition 5 allows the receiver to sustain his off-path actions using any belief p ∈ ∆(Θ). We
now turn to our main result, which focuses on refining off-path beliefs. We prove that patient
stability selects a strict subset of the Nash equilibria, namely those that satisfy the compatibility
criterion.
Definition 11. For a fixed strategy profile pi∗, let u1(θ; pi∗) denote the payoff to type θ under
pi∗, and let
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J(s, pi∗) :=
{
θ ∈ Θ : max
a∈A
u1(θ, s, a) > u1(θ; pi∗)
}
be the set of types for which some response to signal s is strictly better than their payoff under
pi∗. Signal s is weakly equilibrium dominated for types in the complement of J(s, pi∗).
The admissible beliefs at signal s under profile pi∗ are
P (s, pi∗) :=
⋂{
Pθ′.θ′′ : θ
′ s θ′′ and θ′ ∈ J(s, pi∗)
}
where Pθ′.θ′′ is defined in Equation (5).
That is, P (s, pi∗) is the joint belief restriction imposed by a family of Pθ′.θ′′ for (θ
′
, θ
′′) sat-
isfying two conditions: θ′ is more type-compatible with s than θ′′ , and furthermore the more
compatible type θ′ belongs to J(s, pi∗). If there are no pairs (θ′ , θ′′) satisfying these two condi-
tions, then (by convention of intersection over no elements) P (s, pi∗) is defined as ∆(Θ). In any
signaling game and for any pi∗, the set P (s, pi∗) is always nonempty because it always contains
the prior λ.
Definition 12. Strategy profile pi∗ satisfies the compatibility criterion if pi2(·|s) ∈ ∆(BR(P (s, pi∗), s))
for every s.
Like divine equilibrium but unlike the Intuitive Criterion or Cho and Kreps (1987)’s D1
criterion, the compatibility criterion says only that some signals should not increase the relative
probability of “implausible” types, as opposed to requiring that these types have probability 0.
One might imagine a version of the compatibility criterion where the belief restriction Pθ′.θ′′
applies whenever θ′ s θ′′ . To understand why we require the additional condition that θ′ ∈
J(s, pi∗) in the definition of admissible beliefs, recall that Lemma 3 only gives a learning guarantee
in the receiver’s problem when pi1(s|θ′) is “large enough” for the more type-compatible θ′ . In the
extreme case where s is a strictly dominated signal for θ′ , she will never play it during learning.
It turns out that if s is weakly equilibrium dominated for θ′ , then θ′ may still not experiment
very much with it. On the other hand, the next lemma provides a lower bound on the frequency
that θ′ experiments with s′ when θ′ ∈ J(s′ , pi∗) and δ and γ are close to 1.
Lemma 4. Fix a regular prior g and a strategy profile pi∗ where for some type θ′ and signal
s
′, θ′ ∈ J(s′ , pi∗). There exist a number  ∈ (0, 1) and threshold functions δ¯ : N → (0, 1) and
γ¯ : N × (0, 1) → (0, 1) such that whenever pi ∈ Π∗(g, δ, γ) with δ ≥ δ¯(N) and γ ≥ γ¯(N, δ) and pi
is no more than  away from pi∗ in L1 distance20, we have pi1(s
′|θ′) ≥ (1− γ) ·N.
20 The L1 distance is
d(pi, pi∗) =
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
s∈S
|pi1(s|θ)− pi∗1(s|θ)|+
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A
|pi2(a|s)− pi∗2(a|s)|.
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Note that since pi1(s|θ′) is between 0 and 1, we know that (1− γ¯(N, δ)) ·N < 1 for each N .
The proof of this lemma is in the Online Appendix. To gain an intuition for it, suppose that
not only is s′ equilibrium undominated in pi∗, but furthermore s′ can lead to the highest signaling
game payoff for type θ′ under some receiver response a′ . Because the prior is non-doctrinaire,
the Gittins index of each signal in the learning problem approaches its highest possible payoff
in the stage game as the sender becomes infinitely patient. Therefore, for every N ∈ N, when γ
and δ are close enough to 1, a new type θ′ will play s′ in each of the first N periods of her life,
regardless of what responses she receives during that time. These N periods account for roughly
(1− γ) ·N fraction of her life, proving the lemma in this special case. It turns out that even if s′
does not lead to the highest potential payoff in the signaling game, long-lived players will have
a good estimate of their steady-state payoff. So, type θ′ will still play any s′ that is equilibrium
undominated in strategy profile pi∗ at least N times in any steady states that are sufficiently close
to pi∗, though these N periods may not occur at the beginning of her life.
Theorem 2. Every patiently stable strategy profile pi∗ satisfies the compatibility criterion.
The proof combines Lemma 2, Lemma 3, and Lemma 4. Lemma 2 shows that types that are
more compatible with s′ play it more often. Lemma 4 says that types for whom s′ is not weakly
equilibrium dominated will play it “many times.” Finally, Lemma 3 shows that the “many times”
here is sufficiently large that most receivers correctly believe that more compatible types play s′
more than less compatible types do, so their posterior odds ratio for more versus less compatible
types exceeds the prior ratio.
Proof. Suppose pi∗ is patiently stable under regular prior g. Fix an s′ and an action aˆ /∈
BR(P (s′ , pi∗), s′). Let h > 0 be given. We will show that pi∗2(aˆ|s′) < h. Since the choices of
s
′ , aˆ, and h > 0 are arbitrary, we will have proven the theorem.
Step 1: Setting some constants.
In the statement of Lemma 3, for each pair θ′ , θ′′ such that θ′ s′ θ′′ and θ′ ∈ J(s′ , pi∗), put
 = h2|Θ|2 and find Cθ′ ,θ′′ and γθ′ ,θ′′ so that the result holds. Let C be the maximum of all such
Cθ′ ,θ′′ and γ be the maximum of all such γθ′ ,θ′′ . Also find n ≥ 1 so that
1− 1
n
> 1− h2|Θ|2 . (6)
In the statement of Lemma 4, for each θ′ such that θ′ s′ θ′′ for at least one θ′′ , find θ′ , δ¯θ′ (nC),
γ¯θ′ (nC, δ) so that the lemma holds. Write ∗ > 0 as the minimum of all such θ′ and let δ¯∗(nC)
and γ¯∗(nC, δ) represent the maximum of δθ′ and γθ′ across such θ
′ .
Step 2: Finding a steady-state profile with large δ, γ that approximates pi∗.
Since pi∗ is patiently stable under g, there exists a sequence of strategy profiles pi(j) → pi∗
where pi(j) is δj-stable under g with δj → 1. Each pi(j) can be written as the limit of steady-state
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strategy profiles. That is, for each j, there exists γj,k → 1 and a sequence of steady-state profiles
pi(j,k) ∈ Π∗(g, δj, γj,k) such that limk→∞ pi(j,k) = pi(j).
The convergence of the array pi(j,k) to pi∗ means we may find j ∈ N and function k(j) so
that whenever j ≥ j and k ≥ k(j), pi(j,k) is no more than min(∗, h2|Θ|2 ) away from pi∗. Find
j◦ ≥ j large enough so δ◦ := δj◦ > δ¯∗(nC), and then find a large enough k◦ > k(j◦) so that
γ◦ := γj◦,k◦ > max(γ¯∗(nC, δ◦), γ). So we have identified a steady-state profile pi◦ := pi(j
◦,k◦) ∈
Π∗(g, δ◦, γ◦) which approximates pi∗ to within min(∗, h2|Θ|2 ).
Step 3: Applying properties of R1 and R2.
For each pair θ′ , θ′′ such that θ′ s′ θ′′ and θ′ ∈ J(s′ , pi∗), we will bound the probability that
pi◦2(·|s′) does not best respond to Pθ′.θ′′ by h|Θ|2 . Since there are at most |Θ| · (|Θ| − 1) such
pairs in the intersection defining P (s′ , pi∗), this would imply that pi◦2(aˆ|s′) < [|Θ| · (|Θ| − 1)] · h|Θ|2
since aˆ /∈ BR(P (s′ , pi∗), s′). And since pi◦2 is no more than h2|Θ|2 away from pi2, this would show
pi2(aˆ|s′) < h.
By construction pi◦ is closer than θ′ to pi∗, and furthermore δ◦ ≥ δ¯θ′ (nC) and γ◦ ≥ γ¯θ′ (nC, δ◦).
By Lemma 4, pi◦1(s
′ |θ′) ≥ nC(1 − γ◦). At the same time, pi◦1 = R1[pi◦2] and θ′ s′ θ′′ , so Lemma
2 implies that pi◦1(s
′|θ′) ≥ pi◦1(s′ |θ′′). Turning to the receiver side, pi◦2 = R2[pi◦1] with pi◦1 satisfying
the conditions of Lemma 3 associated with  = h2|Θ|2 and γ
◦ ≥ γ. Therefore, we conclude
pi◦2(BR(Pθ′.θ′′ , s
′) | s′) ≥ 1− 1
n
− h2|Θ|2 .
But by construction of n in Equation (6), 1 − 1
n
> 1 − h2|Θ|2 . So the LHS is at least 1 − h|Θ|2 , as
desired.
Remark 4. More generally, consider any model for our populations of agents with geometrically
distributed lifetimes that generates aggregate response functions R1 and R2. Defining the steady
states under (g, δ, γ) as the strategy profiles pi∗ such that Rg,δ,γ1 (pi∗2) = pi∗1 and R
g,δ,γ
2 (pi∗1) = pi∗2,
the proof of Theorem 2 applies to the patiently stable profiles of the new learning model provided
that R1 satisfies the conclusion of Lemma 2, R2 satisfies the conclusion of Lemma 3, and Lemma
4 is valid for (θ′ , s′) pairs such that θ′ s′ θ′′ for at least one type θ′′and θ′ ∈ J(s′ , pi∗).
We outline two such more general learning models below. (The proof is in the Online Ap-
pendix.)
Corollary 1. With either of the following modifications of the steady-state learning model from
Section 2, every patiently stable strategy profile still satisfies the compatibility criterion.
(i). Heterogeneous priors. There is a finite collection of regular sender priors {g1,k}nk=1 and
a finite collection of regular receiver priors {g2,k}nk=1. Upon birth, an agent is endowed with
a random prior, where the distributions over priors are µ1 and µ2 for senders and receivers.
An agent’s prior is independent of her payoff type, and furthermore no one ever observes
another person’s prior.
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(ii). Social learning. Suppose 1−α fraction of the senders are “normal learners” as described
in Section 2, but the remaining 0 < α < 1 fraction are “social learners.” At the end of each
period, a social learner can observe the extensive-form strategies of her matched receiver
and of c > 0 other matches sampled uniformly at random. Each sender knows whether she
is a normal learner or a social learner upon birth, which is uncorrelated with her payoff
type. Receivers cannot distinguish between the two kinds of senders.
Example 1 (Continued). The beer-quiche game of Example 1 has two components of Nash equi-
libria: “beer-pooling equilibria” where both types play Beer with probability 1, and “quiche-
pooling equilibria” where both types play Quiche with probability 1. In a quiche-pooling equi-
librium pi∗, type θstrong’s equilibrium payoff is 2, so θstrong ∈ J(Beer, pi∗) since θstrong’s highest
possible payoff under Beer is 3, and we have already shown that θstrong Beer θweak. So,
P (Beer, pi∗) =
{
p ∈ ∆(Θ) : p(θweak)
p(θstrong)
≤ λ(θweak)
λ(θstrong)
= 1/9
}
.
Fight is not a best response after Beer to any such belief, so equilibria in which Fight
occurs with positive probability after Beer do not satisfy the compatibility criterion, and thus
no quiche-pooling equilibrium is patiently stable. Since the set of patiently stable outcomes is
a nonempty subset of the set of Nash equilibria, pooling on beer is the unique patiently stable
outcome.
By Corollary 1, quiche-pooling equilibria are still not patiently stable in more general learning
models involving either heterogeneous priors or social learners. 
5.4 Patient Stability and Equilibrium Dominance
In generic signaling games, equilibria where the receiver plays a pure strategy must satisfy a
stronger condition than the compatibility criterion to be patiently stable.
Definition 13. Let
J˜(s, pi∗) :=
{
θ ∈ Θ : max
a∈A
u1(θ, s, a) ≥ u1(θ; pi∗)
}
.
If J˜(s′ , pi∗) is nonempty, define the strongly admissible beliefs at signal s′ under profile pi∗ to
be
P˜ (s′ , pi∗) := ∆(J˜(s′ , pi∗))
⋂{
Pθ′.θ′′ : θ
′ s′ θ
′′}
where Pθ′.θ′′ is defined in Equation (5). Otherwise, define P˜ (s
′
, pi∗) := ∆(Θ).
Here, J˜(s, pi∗) is the set of types for which some response to signal s is at least as good
as their equilibrium payoff under pi∗ — that is, the set of types for whom s is not equilibrium
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dominated in the sense of Cho and Kreps (1987). Note that P˜ , unlike P, assigns probability 0 to
equilibrium-dominated types, which is the belief restriction of the Intuitive Criterion.
Definition 14. A Nash equilibrium pi∗ is on-path strict for the receiver if for every on-path signal
s∗, pi2(a∗|s∗) = 1 for some a∗ ∈ A and u2(s∗, a∗, pi1) > maxa6=a∗ u2(s∗, a, pi1).
Of course, the receiver cannot have strict ex ante preferences over play at unreached infor-
mation sets; this condition is called “on-path strict” because it places no restrictions on the
receiver’s incentives after off-path signals. In generic signaling games, all pure-strategy equilibria
are on-path strict for the receiver, but the same is not true for mixed-strategy equilibria.
Definition 15. A strategy profile pi∗ satisfies the strong compatibility criterion if at every signal
s
′ we have
pi∗2(·|s
′) ∈ ∆(BR(P˜ (s′ , pi∗), s′)).
It is immediate that the strong compatibility criterion implies the compatibility criterion,
since it places more stringent restrictions on the receiver’s behavior. It is also immediate that
the strong compatibility criterion implies the Intuitive Criterion.
Theorem 3. Suppose pi∗ is on-path strict for the receiver and patiently stable. Then it satisfies
the strong compatibility criterion.
The proof of this theorem appears in Appendix A.5. The main idea is that when off-path
signal s′ is equilibrium dominated in pi∗ for type θD but not even weakly equilibrium dominated
for type θU, type θU will experiment “infinitely more often” with s′ than θD does. Indeed, we
can provide an upper bound on the steady-state probability that θD ever switches away from its
equilibrium signal s∗ after trying it for the first time21, which is also an upper bound on how often
θD experiments with s′ , while Lemma 4 provides a lower bound for how oftenθU plays s′ . We
show there is a sequence of steady-state profiles pi(k) ∈ Π∗(g, δk, γk) with γk → 1 and pi(k) → pi∗
where the ratio of the lower bound to the upper bound goes to infinity. Applying Theorem 2
of Fudenberg, He, and Imhof (2017), we can then prove receivers will infer that an s′-sender is
“infinitely more likely” to be θU than θD, which means receivers must assign probability 0 to θD
after s′ in equilibrium pi∗.
Remark 5. As noted by Fudenberg and Kreps (1988) and Sobel, Stole, and Zapater (1990), it
seems “intuitive” that learning and rational experimentation should lead receivers to assign prob-
ability 0 to types that are equilibrium dominated, so it might seem surprising that this theorem
needs the additional assumption that the equilibrium is on-path strict for the receiver. However,
21This upper bound does not apply when pi∗ is not on-path strict for the receiver. When pi∗ involves the receiver
strictly mixing between several responses after s∗, some of these responses might make θD strictly worse off than
her worst payoff after s′ , so there is non-vanishing probability that that θD observes a large number of these bad
responses in a row and then stops playing s∗.
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in our model senders start out initially uncertain about the receivers’ play, and so even types for
whom a signal is equilibrium dominated might initially experiment with it. Showing that these
experiments do not lead to “perverse” responses by the receivers requires some arguments about
the relative probabilities with which equilibrium-dominated types and non-equilibrium-dominated
types play off-path signals. When the equilibrium involves on-path receiver randomization, a non-
trivial fraction of receivers could play an action after a type’s equilibrium signal that the type
finds strictly worse than her worst payoff under an off-path signal. In this case, we do not see
how to show that the probability she ever switches away from her equilibrium signal tends to
0 with patience, since the event of seeing a large number of these unfavorable responses in a
row has probability bounded away from 0 even when the receiver population plays exactly their
equilibrium strategy. However, we do not have a counterexample to show that the conclusion of
the theorem fails without on-path strictness for the receiver.
Example 3. In the following modified beer-quiche game, the payoffs of fighting a type θweak who
drinks beer have been substantially increased relative to Example 1, so that Fight is now a best
response to the prior belief λ after Beer.
Since the prior λ is always an admissible belief in any signaling game after any signal, the
Nash equilibrium pi∗ where both types play Quiche (supported by the receiver playing Fight
after Beer) is not ruled out by the compatibility criterion, unlike in Example 1. However,
this equilibrium is ruled out by the strong compatibility criterion. To see why, note that this
pooling equilibrium is on-path strict for the receiver, because the receiver has a strict preference
for NotFight at the only on-path signal, Quiche. Moreover, pi∗ does not satisfy the strong
compatibility criterion, because J˜(Beer, pi∗) = {θstrong} implies the only strongly admissible
belief after Beer assigns probability 1 to the sender being θstrong. Thus Theorem 3 implies that
this equilibrium is not patiently stable. 
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6 Discussion
Our learning model supposes that the agents have geometrically distributed lifetimes, which
is one of the reasons that the senders’ optimization problems can be solved using the Gittins
index. If agents were to have fixed finite lifetimes, as in Fudenberg and Levine (1993, 2006),
their optimization problem would not be stationary, and the finite-horizon analog of the Gittins
index is only approximately optimal for the finite-horizon multi-armed bandit problem (Niño-
Mora, 2011). Applying the geometric-lifetime framework to steady-state learning models for
other classes of extensive-form games could prove fruitful, especially for games where we need to
compare the behavior of various players or player types, and in studies of other sorts of dynamic
decisions.
Theorem 1 provides a comparison between the dynamic behavior of two agents in a geometric-
lifetime bandit problem based on their static preferences over the prizes. As an immediate
application, consider a principal-agent setting where the agent faces a multi-armed bandit with
arms s ∈ S, where s leads a prize drawn from Zs according to some distribution. The principal
knows the agent’s per-period utility function u : ∪sZs → R, but not the agent’s beliefs over the
prize distributions of different arms or agent’s discount factor. Suppose the principal observes
the agent choosing arm 1 in the first period. The principal can impose taxes and subsidies on the
different prizes and arms, changing the agent’s utility function to u˜. For what taxes and subsidies
would the agent still have chosen arm 1 in the first period, irrespective of her initial beliefs and
discount factor? According to Theorem 1, the answer is precisely those taxes and subsidies such
that arm 1 is more type-compatible with u˜ than u.
Our results provide an upper bound on the set of patiently stable strategy profiles in a
signaling game. In Fudenberg and He (2017), we provided a lower bound for the same set, as well
as a sharper upper bound under additional restrictions on the priors. But together, these results
will not give an exact characterization of patiently stable outcomes. Nevertheless, our results do
show how the theory of learning in games provides a foundation for refining the set of equilibria
in signaling games.
In future work, we hope to investigate a learning model featuring temporary sender types.
Instead of the sender’s type being assigned at birth and fixed for life, at the start of each period
each sender takes an i.i.d. draw from λ to discover her type for that period. When the players
are impatient, this yields different steady states than the fixed-type model here, as noted by
Dekel, Fudenberg, and Levine (2004). This model will require different tools to analyze, since
the sender’s problem becomes a restless bandit.
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A Appendix – Relegated Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1:
(i). s′ is transitive.
(ii). Except when s′ is either strictly dominant for both θ′ and θ′′ or strictly dominated for both
θ
′ and θ′′ , θ′ s′ θ′′ implies θ′′ 6s′ θ′ .
Proof. To show (i), suppose θ′ s′ θ′′ and θ′′ s′ θ′′′ . For any pi2 ∈ Π2 where s′ is weakly optimal
for θ′′′ , it must be strictly optimal for θ′′ , hence also strictly optimal for θ′ . This shows θ′ s′ θ′′′ .
To establish (ii), partition the set of receiver strategies as Π2 = Π+2 ∪Π02∪Π−2 , where the three
subsets refer to receiver strategies that make s′ strictly better, indifferent, or strictly worse than
the best alternative signal for θ′′ . If the set Π02 is nonempty, then θ
′ s′ θ′′ implies θ′′ 6s′ θ′ . This
is because against any pi2 ∈ Π02, signal s′ is strictly optimal for θ′ but only weakly optimal for
θ
′′ . At the same time, if both Π+2 and Π−2 are nonempty, then Π02 is nonempty. This is because
both pi2 7→ u1(θ′′ , s′ , pi2(·|s′)) and pi2 7→ maxs′′ 6=s′ u1(θ′′ , s′′ , pi2(·|s′′)) are continuous functions, so
for any pi+2 ∈ Π+2 and pi−2 ∈ Π−2 , there exists α ∈ (0, 1) so that αpi+2 + (1 − α)pi−2 ∈ Π02. If only
Π+2 is nonempty and θ
′ s′ θ′′ , then s′ is strictly dominant for both θ′ and θ′′ . If only Π−2 is
nonempty, then we can have θ′′ s′ θ′ only when s′ is never a weak best response for θ′ against
any pi2 ∈ Π2.
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1: For every signal s, stopping time τ , belief νs, and discount factor β, there exists
pi2,s(τ, νs, β) ∈ ∆(A) so that for every θ,
Eνs
{∑τ−1
t=0 β
t · u1(θ, s, as(t))
}
Eνs
{∑τ−1
t=0 β
t
} = u1(θ, s, pi2,s(τ, νs, β))
Proof. Step 1: Induced mixed actions.
A belief νs and a stopping time τs together define a stochastic process (At)t≥0 over the space
A ∪ {∅}, where At ∈ A corresponds to the receiver action seen in period t if τs has not yet
stopped (τs > t), and At := ∅ if τs has stopped (τs ≤ t). Enumerating A = {a1, ..., an}, we write
pt,i := Pνs [At = ai] for 1 ≤ i ≤ n to record the probability of seeing receiver action ai in period
t and pt,0 := Pνs [At = ∅] = Pνs [τs ≤ t] for the probability of seeing no receiver action in period t
due to τs having stopped.
Given νs and τs, we define the induced mixed actions after signal s, pi2,s(νs, τs, β) ∈ ∆(A) by:
pi2,s(νs, τs, β)(a) :=
∑∞
t=0 β
tpt,i∑∞
t=0 β
t(1− pt,0) for i such that a = ai.
As ∑ni=1 pt,i = 1 − pt,0 for each t ≥ 0, it is clear that pi2,s(νs, τs, β) puts nonnegative weights
on actions in A that sum to 1, so pi2,s(νs, τs, β) ∈ ∆(A) may indeed be viewed as a mixture over
receiver actions.
Step 2: Induced mixed actions and per-period payoff.
We now show that for any β and any stopping time τs for signal s, the normalized payoff in
the stopping problem is equal to the utility of playing s against pi2,s(νs, τs, β) for one period, that
is,
u1(θ, s, pi2,s(νs, τs, β)) = Eνs
{
τs−1∑
t=0
βt · u1(θ, s, as(t))
}
/ Eνs
{
τs−1∑
t=0
βt
}
.
To see why this is true, rewrite the denominator of the right-hand side as
Eνs
{
τs−1∑
t=0
βt
}
= Eνs
{ ∞∑
t=0
[1τs>t] · βt
}
=
∞∑
t=0
βt · Pνs [τs > t] =
∞∑
t=0
βt(1− pt,0),
and rewrite the numerator as
Eνs
{
τs−1∑
t=0
βt · u1(θ, s, as(t))
}
=
∞∑
t=0
βt ·
 pt,0 · 0︸ ︷︷ ︸get 0 if already stopped +
n∑
i=1
pt,i · u1(θ, s, ai)︸ ︷︷ ︸
else, as(t) distributed as (pt,i)

=
n∑
i=1
( ∞∑
t=0
βt · pt,i
)
· u1(θ, s, ai).
36
So overall, we get as desired:
Eνs
{
τs−1∑
t=0
βt · u1(θ, s, as(t))
}
/ Eνs
{
τs−1∑
t=0
βt
}
=
n∑
i=1
[
(∑∞t=0 βt · pt,i)∑∞
t=0 β
t(1− pt,0)
]
· u1(θ, s, ai)
= u1(θ, s, pi2,s(νs, τs, β)).
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3: Let regular prior g2, types θ
′
, θ
′′ , and signal s′ be fixed. For every  > 0, there exists
C > 0 and γ < 1 so that for any 0 ≤ δ < 1, γ ≤ γ < 1, and n ≥ 1, if pi1(s′|θ′) ≥ pi1(s′|θ′′) and
pi1(s
′|θ′) ≥ (1− γ)nC, then
R2[pi1](BR(Pθ′.θ′′ , s
′) | s′) ≥ 1− 1
n
− .
We invoke Theorem 2 of Fudenberg, He, and Imhof (2017), which in our setting says:
Let regular prior g2 and signal s
′ be fixed. Let 0 < , h < 1. There exists C such that
whenever pi1(s
′ |θ′) ≥ pi1(s′|θ′′) and t · pi1(s′ |θ′) ≥ C, we get
ψpi12
(
y2 ∈ Y2[t] : p(θ
′′|s′ ; y2)
p(θ′|s′ ; y2) ≤
1
1− h ·
λ(θ′′)
λ(θ′)
)
/ψpi12 (Y2[t]) ≥ 1− 
where p(θ|s; y2) refers to the conditional probability that a sender of s is type θ ac-
cording to the posterior belief induced by history y2.
That is, if at age t a receiver would have observed in expectation C instances of type θ′ sending
s
′ , then the belief of at least 1 −  fraction of age t receivers (essentially) falls in Pθ′.θ′′ after
seeing the signal s′ . The proof of Lemma 3 calculates what fraction of receivers meets this “age
requirement.”
Proof. We will show the following stronger result:
Let regular prior g2, types θ
′
, θ
′′ , and signal s′ be fixed. For every  > 0, there exists C > 0
so that for any 0 ≤ δ, γ < 1 and n ≥ 1, if pi1(s′|θ′) ≥ pi1(s′ |θ′′) and pi1(s′ |θ′) ≥ (1− γ)nC, then
R2[pi1](BR(Pθ′.θ′′ , s
′) | s′) ≥ γd 1n(1−γ)e − 
The lemma follows because we may pick a large enough γ < 1 so that γd 1n(1−γ)e > 1 − 1
n
for
all n ≥ 1 and γ ≥ γ.
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For each 0 < h < 1, define P h
θ′.θ′′ :=
{
p ∈ ∆(Θ) : p(θ
′′ )
p(θ′ ) ≤ 11−h ·
λ(θ′′ )
λ(θ′ )
}
,with the convention
that 00 = 0. Then it is clear that each P
h
θ′.θ′′ , as well as Pθ′.θ′′ itself, is a closed subset of ∆(Θ).
Also, P h
θ′.θ′′ → Pθ′.θ′′ as h→ 0.
Fix action a ∈ A. If for all h¯ > 0 there exists some 0 < h ≤ h¯ so that a ∈ BR(P h
θ′.θ′′ , s
′),
then a ∈ BR(Pθ′.θ′′ , s′) also due to best-response correspondence having a closed graph. This
means that, for each a /∈ BR(Pθ′.θ′′ , s′), there exists h¯a > 0 so that a /∈ BR(P hθ′.θ′′ , s
′) whenever
0 < h ≤ h¯a. Let h¯ := mina/∈BR(P
θ
′
.θ
′′ ,s′ ) h¯a. Let  > 0 be given and apply Theorem 2 of Fudenberg,
He, and Imhof (2017) with  and h¯ to find constant C.
When pi1(s
′|θ′) ≥ pi1(s′|θ′′) and pi1(s′ |θ′) ≥ (1 − γ)nC, consider an age t receiver for t ≥⌈
1
n(1−γ)
⌉
. Since t · pi1(s′ |θ′) ≥ C, Theorem 2 of Fudenberg, He, and Imhof (2017) implies there
is probability at least 1 −  this receiver’s belief about the types who send s′ falls in P h¯
θ′.θ′′ . By
construction of h¯, BR(P h¯
θ′.θ′′ , s
′) = BR(Pθ′.θ′′ , s
′), so 1 −  of age t receivers have a history y2
where σ2(y2)(s
′) ∈ BR(Pθ′.θ′′ , s′).
Since agents survive between periods with probability γ, the mass of the receiver population
aged
⌈
1
n(1−γ)
⌉
or older is (1− γ) ·∑∞
t=d 1n(1−γ)e γ
t = γd 1n(1−γ)e.This shows
R2[pi1](BR(Pθ′.θ′′ , s
′) | s′) ≥ γ 1n(1−γ) · (1− ) ≥ γd 1n(1−γ)e − 
as desired.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2: pi∗ ∈ Π∗(g, δ, γ) if and only if Rg,δ,γ1 [pi∗2] = pi∗1 and Rg,δ,γ2 [pi∗1] = pi∗2.
Proof. If : Suppose pi∗ is such that R1[pi∗2] = pi∗1 and R2[pi∗1] = pi∗2. Consider the state ψ∗ defined
as ψ∗θ := ψ
pi∗2
θ for each θ and ψ∗2 := ψ
pi∗1
2 . Then, by construction σθ(ψ
pi∗2
θ ) = pi∗θ and σ2(ψ
pi∗1
2 ) = pi∗2, so
the state ψ∗ gives rise to pi∗. To verify that ψ∗ is a steady state, we can expand by the definition
of ψpi
∗
2
θ ,
fθ(ψ
pi∗2
θ , pi
∗
2) = fθ
(
lim
T→∞
fTθ (ψ˜θ, pi∗2), pi∗2
)
,
where ψ˜θ is any arbitrary initial state.
Since fθ is continuous22 at ψ
pi∗2
θ in L1 distance defined in Footnote 20, limT→∞ fTθ (ψ˜θ, pi∗2) = ψ
pi∗2
θ
is a fixed point of fθ(·, pi∗2). To see this, write ψ(T )θ := fTθ (ψ˜θ, pi∗2) for each T ≥ 1 and let  > 0 be
given. Continuity of fθ implies there is ζ > 0 so that d(fθ(ψ
pi∗2
θ , pi
∗
2), fθ(ψ
(T )
θ , pi
∗
2)) < /2 whenever
d(ψpi
∗
2
θ , ψ
(T )
θ ) < ζ. So pick a large enough T so that d(ψ
pi∗2
θ , ψ
(T )
θ ) < ζ and also d(ψ
pi∗2
θ , ψ
(T+1)
θ ) < /2.
Then
d(fθ(ψ
pi∗2
θ , pi
∗
2), ψ
pi∗2
θ ) ≤ d(fθ(ψpi
∗
2
θ , pi
∗
2), fθ(ψ
(T )
θ , pi
∗
2)) + d(ψ
(T+1)
θ , ψ
pi∗2
θ ) < /2 + /2.
22This is implied by Step 1 of the proof of Proposition 3 in the Online Appendix, which shows fθ is continuous
at all states that assign (1− γ)γt mass to the set of length-t histories.
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Since  > 0 was arbitrary, we have shown that fθ(ψ
pi∗2
θ , pi
∗
2) = ψ
pi∗2
θ and a similar argument
shows f2(ψ
pi∗1
2 , pi
∗
1) = ψ
pi∗1
2 . This tells us ψ∗ = ((ψ
pi∗2
θ )θ∈Θ, ψ
pi∗1
2 ) is a steady state.
Only if : Conversely, suppose pi∗ ∈ Π∗(g, δ, γ). Then there exists a steady state ψ∗ ∈ Ψ∗(g, δ, γ)
such that pi∗ = σ(ψ∗). This means fθ(ψ∗θ , pi∗2) = ψ∗θ , so iterating shows
ψ
pi∗2
θ := lim
T→∞
fTθ (ψ∗θ , pi∗2) = ψ∗θ .
Since R1[pi∗2](·|θ) := σθ(ψpi
∗
2
θ ), the above implies R1[pi∗2](·|θ) = σθ(ψ∗θ) = pi∗1(·|θ) by the choice of of
ψ∗. We can similarly show R2[pi∗1] = pi∗2.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 3
Throughout this subsection, we will make use of the following version of Hoeffding’s inequality.
Fact. (Hoeffding’s inequality) Suppose X1, ..., Xn are independent random variables on R such
that ai ≤ Xi ≤ bi with probability 1 for each i. Write Sn := ∑ni=1Xi. Then,
P [|Sn − E[Sn]| ≥ d] ≤ 2 exp
(
− 2d
2∑n
i=1(bi − ai)2
)
.
Lemma A.1. In strategy profile pi∗, suppose s∗ is on-path and pi∗2(a∗|s∗) = 1, where a∗ is a strict
best response to s∗ given pi∗1. Then there exists N ∈ R so that, for any regular prior and any
sequence of steady-state strategy profiles pi(k) ∈ Π∗(g, δk, γk) where γk → 1,pi(k) → pi∗, there exists
K ∈ N such that whenever k ≥ K, we have pi(k)2 (a∗|s∗) ≥ 1− (1− γk) ·N .
Proof. Since a∗ is a strict best response after s∗ for pi∗1, there exists  > 0 so that a∗ will continue to
be a strict best response after s∗ for any pi′1 ∈ Π1 where for every θ ∈ Θ, |pi′1(s∗|θ)−pi∗1(s∗|θ)| < 3.
Since pi(k) → pi∗, find large enoughK such that k ≥ K implies for every θ ∈ Θ,
∣∣∣pi(k)1 (s∗|θ)− pi∗1(s∗|θ)∣∣∣ <
.
Write eobsn,θ for the probability that an age-n receiver has encountered type θ fewer than 12nλ(θ)
times. We will find a number Nobs <∞ so that
∑
θ∈Θ
∞∑
n=0
eobsn,θ ≤ Nobs.
Fix some θ ∈ Θ. Write Z(θ)t ∈ {0, 1} as the indicator random variable for whether the receiver
sees a type θ in period t of his life and write Sn :=
∑n
t=1 Z
(θ)
t for the total number of type θ
encountered up to age n. We have E[Sn] = nλ(θ), so we can use Hoeffding’s inequality to bound
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eobsn,θ .
eobsn,θ ≤ P
[
|Sn − E[Sn]| ≥ 12nλ(θ)
]
≤ 2 exp
(
−2 · [
1
2nλ(θ)]
2
n
)
.
This shows eobsn,θ tends to 0 at the same rate as exp(−n), so
∞∑
n=0
eobsn,θ ≤
∞∑
n=0
2 exp
(
−2 · [
1
2nλ(θ)]
2
n
)
=: Nobsθ <∞.
So we set Nobs := ∑θ∈ΘNobsθ .
Next, write ebias,kn,θ for the probability that, after observing
⌊
1
2nλ(θ)
⌋
i.i.d. draws from pi(k)1 (·|θ),
the empirical frequency of signal s∗ differs from pi(k)1 (s∗|θ) by more than 2. So again, write
Zθ,kt ∈ {0, 1} to indicate if the t-th draw resulted in signal s∗, with E
[
Zθ,kt
]
= pi(k)1 (s∗|θ), and
put Sn,k :=
∑b 12nλ(θ)c
t=1 Z
θ,k
t for total number of s∗ out of
⌊
1
2nλ(θ)
⌋
draws. We have E[Sn,k] =⌊
1
2nλ(θ)
⌋
· pi(k)1 (s∗|θ), but
∣∣∣pi(k)1 (s∗|θ)− pi∗1(s∗|θ)∣∣∣ <  whenever k ≥ K. That means,
ebias,kn,θ :=P
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Sn,k⌊12nλ(θ)⌋ − pi
∗
1(s∗|θ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2

≤P
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Sn,k⌊12nλ(θ)⌋ − pi
(k)
1 (s∗|θ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 
 if k ≥ K
=P
[
|Sn,k − E[Sn,k]| ≥
⌊1
2nλ(θ)
⌋
· 
]
≤2 exp
−2 · (
⌊
1
2nλ(θ)
⌋
· )2⌊
1
2nλ(θ)
⌋
 by Hoeffding’s inequality.
Let Nbiasθ :=
∑∞
n=1 2 exp
(
−2·(b
1
2nλ(θ)c·)2
b 12nλ(θ)c
)
, with Nbiasθ < ∞ since the summand tends to 0 at
the same rate asexp(−n). This argument shows that, whenever k ≥ K, we have ∑∞n=1 ebias,kn,θ ≤
Nbiasθ . Now let Nbias :=
∑
θ∈ΘNbiasθ .
Finally, since g is regular, we appeal to Proposition 1 of Fudenberg, He, and Imhof (2017) to
see that there exists some N so that whenever the receiver has a data set of size n ≥ N on type
θ’s play, his Bayesian posterior as to the probability that θ plays s∗ differs from the empirical
distribution by no more than . Put Nage := 2Nminθ∈Θ λ(θ) .
Consider any steady state ψ(k) with k ≥ K. With probability no smaller than 1−∑θ∈Θ ebias,kn,θ ,
an age-n receiver who has seen at least 12nλ(θ) instances of type θ for every θ ∈ Θ will have an
empirical distribution such that every type’s probability of playing s∗ differs from pi∗1(s∗|θ) by less
than 2. If, furthermore, n ≥ Nage, then in fact 12nλ(θ) ≥ N for each θ so the same probability
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bound applies to the event that the receiver’s Bayesian posterior on every type θ playing s∗ is
closer than 3 to pi∗1(s∗|θ). By the construction of , playing a∗ after s∗ is the unique best response
to such a posterior.
Therefore, for k ≥ K, the probability that the sender population plays some action other
than a∗ after s∗ in ψ(k) is bounded by
Nage(1− γk) + (1− γk) ·
∞∑
n=0
γnk ·
∑
θ∈Θ
(
eobsn,θ + e
bias,k
n,θ
)
.
To explain this expression, receivers aged Nage or younger account for no more than Nage(1−
γk) of the population. Among the age n receivers, no more than
∑
θ∈Θ eobsn,θ fraction has a sample
size smaller than 12nλ(θ) for any type θ, while
∑
θ∈Θ e
bias,k
n,θ is an upper bound on the probability
(conditional on having a large enough sample) of having a biased enough sample so that some
type’s empirical frequency of playing s∗ differs by more than 2 from pi∗1(s∗|θ).
But since γk ∈ [0, 1), ∞∑
n=0
γnk ·
∑
θ∈Θ
eobsn,θ <
∞∑
n=0
∑
θ∈Θ
eobsn,θ ≤ Nobs
and ∞∑
n=0
γnk ·
∑
θ∈Θ
ebias,kn,θ <
∞∑
n=0
∑
θ∈Θ
ebias,kn,θ ≤ Nbias.
We conclude that whenever k ≥ K,
pi
(k)
2 (a∗|s∗) ≥ 1− (1− γk) · (Nage +Nobs +Nbias).
Finally, observe that none of Nage, Nobs, Nbias depends on the sequence pi(k), so N is chosen
independent of the sequence pi(k).
Lemma A.2. Assume g is regular. Suppose there is some a∗ ∈ A and v ∈ R so that u1(θ, s∗, a∗) >
v. Then, there exist C1 ∈ (0, 1), C2 > 0 so that in every sender history yθ, #(s∗, a∗|yθ) ≥
C1 ·#(s∗|yθ) + C2 implies E [u1(θ, s∗, pi2(·|s∗))|yθ] > v.
Proof. Write u := mina∈A u1(θ, s∗, a). There exists q ∈ (0, 1) so that
q · u1(θ, s∗, a∗) + (1− q) · u > v.
Find a small enough  > 0 so that 0 < q1− < 1.
Since g is regular, Proposition 1 of Fudenberg, He, and Imhof (2017) tells us there exists some
C0 so that the posterior mean belief of sender with history yθ, is no less than
(1− ) · #(s
∗, a∗|yθ)
#(s∗|yθ) + C0 .
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Whenever this expression is at least q, the expected payoff to θ playing s∗ exceeds v. That
is, it suffices to have
(1− ) · #(s
∗, a∗|yθ)
#(s∗|yθ) + C0 ≥ q ⇐⇒ #(s
∗, a∗|yθ) ≥ q1− #(s
∗|yθ) + q1−  · C0.
Putting C1 := q1− and C2 :=
q
1− · C0 proves the lemma.
Lemma A.3. Let Zt be i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables, where E[Zt] = 1 − . Write Sn :=∑n
t=1 Zt. For 0 < C1 < 1 and C2 > 0, there exist ¯, G1, G2 > 0 such that whenever 0 <  < ¯,
P [Sn ≥ C1n+ C2 ∀n ≥ G1] ≥ 1−G2.
Proof. We make use of a lemma from Fudenberg and Levine (2006), which in turn extends some
inequalities from Billingsley (1995).
FL06 Lemma A.1: Suppose {Xk} is a sequence of i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with
E[Xk] = µ, and define for each n the random variable
Sn :=
|∑nk=1(Xk − µ)|
n
.
Then for any n, n¯ ∈ N,
P
[
max
n≤n≤n¯
Sn > 
]
≤ 2
7
3 ·
1
n
· µ
4
.
For every G1 > 0 and every 0 <  < 1,
P[Sn ≥ C1n+ C2 ∀n ≥ G1] = 1− P
[
(∃n ≥ G1)
n∑
t=1
Zt < C1n+ C2
]
= 1− P
[
(∃n ≥ G1)
n∑
t=1
(Xt − ) > (1− − C1)n− C2
]
,
where Xt := 1 − Zt. Let ¯ := 12(1 − C1) and G1 := 2C2/¯. Suppose 0 <  < ¯. Then for every
n ≥ G1, (1− − C1)n− C2 ≥ ¯n− C2 ≥ 12 ¯n. Hence,
P [Sn ≥ C1n+ C2 ∀n ≥ G1] ≥ 1− P
[
(∃n ≥ G1)
n∑
t=1
(Xt − ) > 12 ¯n
]
and, by FL06 Lemma A.1, the probability on the right-hand side is at most G2 with G2 :=
211/(3G1¯4).
We now prove Theorem 3.
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Theorem 3: Suppose pi∗ is on-path strict for the receiver and patiently stable. Then it
satisfies the strong compatibility criterion.
Proof. Let some a′ /∈ BR(∆(J˜(s′ , pi∗)), s′) and h > 0 be given. We will show that pi∗2(a′|s′) ≤ 3h.
Step 1: Defining the constants ξ, θJ , aθ, sθ, C1, C2, G1, G2, and N recv.
(i) For each ξ > 0, define the ξ-approximations to ∆(J˜(s′ , pi∗)) as the probability distributions
with weight no more than ξ on types outside of J˜(s′ , pi∗),
∆ξ(J˜(s
′
, pi∗)) :=
{
p ∈ ∆(Θ) : p(θ) ≤ ξ ∀θ /∈ J˜(s′ , pi∗)
}
.
Because the best-response correspondence has closed graph, there exists some ξ > 0 so that
a
′
/∈ BR(∆ξ(J˜(s′ , pi∗)), s′).
(ii) Since J˜(s′ , pi∗) is nonempty, we can fix some θJ ∈ J˜(s′ , pi∗).
(iii) For each equilibrium-dominated type θ ∈ Θ\J˜(s′ , pi∗), identify some on-path signal sθ so
that pi∗1(sθ|θ) > 0. By assumption of on-path strictness for the receiver, there is some aθ ∈ A so
that pi∗2(aθ|sθ) = 1, and furthermore, aθ is the strict best response to sθ in pi∗. By the definition
of equilibrium dominance,
u1(θ, sθ, aθ) > max
a∈A
u1(θ, s
′
, a) =: vθ.
By applying Lemma A.2 to each θ ∈ Θ\J˜(s′ , pi∗), we obtain some C1 ∈ (0, 1), C2 > 0 so for
every θ ∈ Θ\J˜(s′ , pi∗) and in every sender history yθ, #(sθ, aθ|yθ) ≥ C1 · #(sθ|yθ) + C2 implies
E [u1(θ, sθ, pi2(·|sθ))|yθ] > vθ.
(iv) By Lemma A.3, find ¯, G1, G2 > 0 such that if E[Zt] = 1 −  are i.i.d. Bernoulli and
Sn :=
∑n
t=1 Zt, then whenever 0 <  < ¯,
P [Sn ≥ C1n+ C2 ∀n ≥ G1] ≥ 1−G2.
(v) Because at pi∗, aθ is a strict best response to sθ for every θ ∈ Θ\J˜(s′ , pi∗), from Lemma
A.1 we may find a N recv so that for each sequence pi(k) ∈ Π∗(g, δk, γk) where γk → 1,pi(k) → pi∗,
there corresponds Krecv ∈ N so that k ≥ Krecv implies pi(k)2 (aθ|sθ) ≥ 1− (1− γk) ·N recv for every
θ ∈ Θ\J˜(s′ , pi∗).
Step 2: Two conditions to ensure that all but 3h receivers believe in ∆ξ(J˜(s
′
, pi∗)).
Consider some steady state ψ ∈ Ψ∗(g, δ, γ) for g regular, δ, γ ∈ [0, 1).
In Theorem 2 of Fudenberg, He, and Imhof (2017), put c = 2
ξ
· maxθ∈Θ λ(θ)
λ(θJ ) and δ =
1
2 . We
conclude that there exists some N rare (not dependent on ψ) such that whenever pi1(s
′ |θJ) ≥
c · pi1(s′|θD) for every equilibrium-dominated type θD /∈ J˜(s′ , pi∗) and
n · pi1(s′|θJ) ≥ N rare, (7)
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then an age-n receiver in steady state ψ where pi = σ(ψ) has probability at least 1−h of holding
a posterior belief g2(·|y2) such that θJ is at least 12c times as likely to play s
′ as θD is for every
θD /∈ J˜(s′ , pi∗). Thus history y2 generates a posterior belief after s′ , p(·|s′ ; y2) such that
p(θD|s′ ; y2)
p(θJ |s′ ; y2) ≤
λ(θD)
λ(θJ) · ξ ·
λ(θJ)
maxθ∈Θ λ(θ)
≤ ξ.
In particular, p(·|s′ ; y2) must assign weight no greater than ξ to each type not in J˜(s′ , pi∗);
therefore, the belief belongs to ∆ξ(J˜(s
′
, pi∗)). By construction of ξ, a′ is then not a best response
to s′ after history y2.
A receiver whose age n satisfies Equation (7) plays a′ with probability less than h, provided
pi1(s
′|θJ) ≥ c · pi1(s′|θD) for every θD /∈ J˜(s′ , pi∗). However, to bound the overall probability of a′
in the entire receiver population in steady state ψ, we ensure that Equation (7) is satisfied for all
except 2h fraction of receivers in ψ. We claim that when γ is large enough, a sufficient condition
is for pi = σ(ψ) to satisfy pi1(s
′|θJ) ≥ (1 − γ)N∗ for some N∗ ≥ N rare/h. This is because under
this condition, any agent aged n ≥ h1−γ satisfies Equation (7), while the fraction of receivers
younger than h1−γ is 1−
(
γ
h
1−γ
)
≤ 2h for γ near enough to 1.
To summarize, in Step 2 we have found a constant N rare and shown that if γ is near enough
to 1, then pi = σ(ψ) has pi2(a
′ |s′) ≤ 3h if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(C1) pi1(s
′ |θJ) ≥ c · pi1(s′ |θD) for every equilibrium-dominated type θD /∈ J˜(s′ , pi∗)
(C2) pi1(s
′|θJ) ≥ (1− γ)N∗ for some N∗ ≥ N rare/h.
In the following step, we show there is a sequence of steady states ψ(k) ∈ Ψ∗(g, δk, γk) with
δk → 1, γk → 1, and σ(ψ(k)) = pi(k) → pi∗ such that, in every pi(k), the above two conditions are
satisfied. Using the fact that γk → 1, we conclude that, for large enough k, we get pi(k)2 (a′|s′) ≤ 3h,
which in turn shows pi∗(a′|s′) ≤ 3h due to the convergence pi(k) → pi∗.
Step 3: Extracting a suitable subsequence of steady states.
In the statement of Lemma 4, put θ′ := θJ . We obtain some number  and functions δ¯(N),
γ¯(N, δ). Put N ratio := 2
ξ
G2 ·N recvmaxθ∈Θ λ(θ)λ(θJ ) and N∗ := max(N ratio, N rare/h).
Since pi∗ is patiently stable, it can be written as the limit of some strategy profiles pi∗ =
limk→∞ pi(k), where each pi(k) is δk-stable with δk → 1. By the definition of δ-stable, each pi(k)
is the limit pi(k) = limj→∞ pi(k,j) with pi(k,j) ∈ Π∗(g, δk, γk,j) with limj→∞ γk,j = 1. It is without
loss to assume that for every k ≥ 1, δk ≥ δ¯(N∗), and that the L1 distance between pi(k) and pi∗
is less than /2. Now, for each k, find a large enough index j(k) so that (i) γk,j(k) ≥ γ(N∗, δk),
(ii) L1 distance between pi(k,j) and pi(k) is less than min( 2 ,
1
k
), and (iii) limk→∞ γk,j(k) = 1. This
generates a sequence of k-indexed steady states, ψ(k,j(k)) ∈ Ψ∗(g, δk, γk,j(k)). We will henceforth
drop the dependence through the function j(k) and just refer to ψ(k) and γk. The sequence
ψ(k) ∈ Ψ∗(g, δk, γk) satisfies: (1) δk → 1, γk → 1; (2) δk ≥ δ¯(N∗) for each k; (3) γk ≥ γ¯(N∗, δk)
for each k; (4) pi(k) → pi∗; (5) the L1 distance between ψ¯(k) and pi∗ is no larger than . Lemma
4 implies that, for every k, pi(k)1 (s
′|θJ) ≥ (1 − γk)N∗. So, every member of the sequence thus
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constructed satisfies condition (C2).
Step 4: An upper bound on experimentation probability of equilibrium-dominated types.
It remains to show that eventually condition (C1) is also satisfied in the sequence constructed
in Step 3. We first bound the rate at which the aggregate receiver strategy pi(k)2 converges to pi∗2.
By Lemma A.1, there exists someKrecv so that k ≥ Krecv implies pi(k)2 (aθ|sθ) ≥ 1−(1−γk)·N recv for
every θ ∈ Θ\J˜(s′ , pi∗). Find next a large enoughKerror so that k ≥ Kerror implies (1−γk)·N recv < ¯
(where ¯ was defined in Step 1).
We claim that when k ≥ max(Krecv, Kerror), a type θ /∈ J˜(s′ , pi∗) sender who always sends
signal sθ against a receiver population that plays pi(k)2 (·|sθ) has less than (1 − γk) · N recv · G2
chance of ever having a posterior belief that the expected payoff to sθ is no greater than vθ in
some period n ≥ G1. This is because by Lemma A.3,
P [Sn ≥ C1n+ C2 ∀n ≥ G1] ≥ 1−G2 · pi(k)2 ({a 6= aθ}|sθ) ≥ 1−G2 · (1− γk) ·N recv
where Sn refers to the number of times that the receiver population responded to sθ with aθ in
the first n times that sθ was sent. But Lemma A.2 guarantees that provided Sn ≥ C1n + C2,
sender’s expected payoff for sθ is strictly above vθ, so we have established the claim.
Finally, find a large enough KGittins so that k ≥ KGittins implies the effective discount factor
δkγk is so near 1 that for every θ /∈ J˜(s′ , pi∗), the Gittins index for signal sθ cannot fall below vθ
if sθ has been used no more than G1 times. (This is possible since the prior is non-doctrinaire.)
Then for k ≥ max(Krecv, Kerror, KGittins), there is less than G2 · (1 − γk) · N recv chance that the
equilibrium-dominated sender θ /∈ J˜(s′ , pi∗) will play s′ even once. To see this, we observe that
according to the prior, the Gittins index for sθ is higher than that of s
′ , whose index is no higher
than its highest possible payoff vθ. This means the sender will not play s
′ until her Gittins index
for sθ has fallen below vθ. Since k ≥ Krecv, this will not happen before the sender has played
sθ at least G1 times, and since k ≥ max(Kerror, Krecv), the previous claim establishes that the
probability of the expected payoff to sθ (and, a fortiori, the Gittins index for sθ) ever falling
below vθ sometime after playing sθ for the G1-th time is no larger than G2 · (1− γk) ·N recv.
This shows that, for k ≥ max(Krecv, Kerror, KGittins), pi(k)1 (s′|θ) ≤ G2N recv · (1− γk) for every
θ /∈ J˜(s′ , pi∗). But since pi(k)1 (s′ |θJ) ≥ N∗ · (1− γk) where N∗ ≥ N ratio = 2ξG2 ·N recvmaxθ∈Θ λ(θ)λ(θJ ) , we
see that condition (C1) is satisfied whenever k ≥ max(Krecv, Kerror, KGittins).
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